2008 UPLB Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, pp.115-128.
Abstract
In the contemporary democratic framework, the supremacy of civilian authority over the military is a fundamental and revered principle. Following this, the only accepted mode of involvement by the military in politics is through military influence. In the Philippines, however, with the seemingly endless political problems hounding the Arroyo administration, applying the principle appears problematic. From President Arroyo’s unconventional ascension to office to the lingering question of legitimacy in her second term, the keen backing of the military for her administration is, no doubt, imperative. Consequently, the continuing reliance of the Arroyo government on military support has amplified the leverage of the military over the civilian government. This condition, in turn, allows the mode of involvement of the military to move from normal influence to undue influence. The military’s undue influence, along with the persistent effort of hostile groups to bring down the Arroyo government, offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. Such a notion, however, seems restrained, since several neutralizing factors reinforce civilian political authority and encourage adherence to democratic principles.
*The author acknowledges the comments of Dr. Carolina Hernandez (on the initial draft) as well as the anonymous reviewers but assumes full responsibility for the final manuscript.
Key Terms
Civilian-Military Relations, Military Influence, Civilian Authority
Introduction
In People Power 2, the Arroyo government started on the wrong footing. On judgment day before the mammoth crowd that had assembled in EDSA, the military reportedly decided to participate in politics. It did not maintain its nonpartisanship; instead, through the cunning stroke of its top brass, it withdrew its support from the Estrada government. The action of the military in backing up the initiative of the people has had dire consequences on the establishment of democratic civilian control. It exposed the successor, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, to excessive and unwarranted influence from the military and weakened the institutionalization of civilian authority (Hernandez 2001). The event gave the military undue influence over the civilian government and reactivated the dynamism of military involvement in politics.
With the seemingly unending political problems hounding the Arroyo administration— among the prominent ones are the persistent question of legitimacy, her unpopularity, the annual threat of impeachment, the clamor for her to resign, and the persistent coup threats— the crisis is bound to continue. Consequently, this guarantees the continuing dependence of the civilian government on military support, which ultimately gives rise to profound leverage of the military over the government.
This study assesses the role that the military plays in contemporary politics in the Arroyo government. It argues that the resulting dependence of the civilian government on military support elevates the political clout of the military to undue influence. Such undue influence offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. However, such a notion, even if it is entertained by the military, appears to be tamed by several factors operating favorably for the civilian government. To explain the situation, the framework of analysis on the levels of military involvement in politics in the context of civil-military relations is first presented. Second, the dependence of the civilian government on unwavering military support is examined. Third, the manifestations of increased military influence, in relation to the political weakness of the government, are highlighted. Lastly, the factors that neutralize the military’s undue influence and sustain civilian political authority are identified and explained.
Framework of Analysis
The contemporary democratic framework typically describes civil-military relations as the balance of power between the civilian political institution and the military institution. The civilian political institution is represented by the elected chief executive of the government who, as commander-in-chief, exercises administration and supervision control over the military. The military institution, on the other hand, is represented by the highest-ranking military officers, who, by virtue of the extremely hierarchical organization, make decisions on behalf of the whole institution. The relationship between the two institutions has been delineated by the long-standing democratic principle of a modern state— supremacy of civilian authority over the military. The military institution, hence, with all its might, is at all times subordinated to civilian authority.
As the ultimate defender of the state and its people and the foremost symbol of nationalism, however, the military cannot absolutely be shut out of politics. By possessing power, primarily through organizational superiority and monopoly of the use of force, it is impossible for the military not to have a political role. Following this premise, the only question is the degree of involvement of the military in politics. The involvement can be viewed through a continuum— from military influence to military participation to military control (Welch, 1976).
Military influence. For most democratic states, military influence is the normal and accepted mode of involvement of the armed forces in politics. The mode is characterized as follows: (1) involvement in politics is limited to the top brass of the chain of command; (2) there is a clear and integral divide between military and political roles, and the officers for the most part confine themselves to the former; (3) political influence is exercised through constitutionally accepted channels; and (4) interactions between the military and civilian political leaders transpire at the top echelon of the military hierarchy (Welch, 1976). Under all categories, moreover, the military openly accedes to the supremacy of civilian authority. Consistent with this, the military confines itself to lobbying, providing information, and offering expert advice to the civilian political leaders. Here, the advice given has a substantial persuasive effect, not because it is anchored on brute force, but because it carries the weight of expertise (Welch, 1976).
To supplement the classification of Welch, military influence can be further categorized as having normal and high levels. At the normal level, military influence on civilian political leaders, as mentioned earlier, is reinforced by a stable and secure civilian political institution. Being stable means that the existence of the government is not threatened, while being secure refers to the presence and effective operation of civilian control (e.g., investigative, appointive, and budgetary powers) over the military. In this arrangement, the government neither feels beholden to, nor manifests civilian dependence on the military.
At the high level of influence, on the other hand, the military has a strong clout over the civilian political leaders when the civilian political institution, although functioning, is unstable and insecure. Here, the existence of the government is threatened, and civilian control over the military is weak. The arrangement creates heavy reliance on the military, and results in dependence of the civilian government. This condition gives more leverage to the military, elevating its mode of involvement from normal influence to undue influence. Although the undue influence of the military is technically acceptable in a democratic framework, it still presents dangers to the civilian authority. The military is faced with the temptation and afforded the opportunity to entertain other avenues to further increase its power and influence.
Military participation. Military participation as a mode of military involvement in politics differs in degree from military influence (Welch, 1976). With military participation, civilian political leaders share political decisions with the military leadership. Power-sharing usually comes about through the initiative of civilian political leaders, who entice the military to help them keep their hold on power, or when civilian political leaders fear being displaced from office by the military, or when inexorable pressure comes from the military. The latter could take the form of hints and actions that range from barely constitutional to serious threats, intimidation, or blackmail, which are unconstitutional (Finer, 1976).
Military participation and high-level military influence differ markedly in the intensity of military power in politics. The fundamental distinction is manifested on four aspects.
First, involvement in political decision. With military participation, there is direct involvement in decision making. With high-level military influence, on the other hand, there is indirect involvement in decision making although the influence carries enormous weight.
Second, adherence to the supremacy of civilian authority. With military participation, the military may become equal partners of civilian political leaders in governance, thus significantly diluting civilian supremacy. With high-level military influence, on the other hand, the supremacy of civilian authority over the military is maintained despite government instability, and civilian dependence that results in undue military influence.
Third, extent of involvement. With military participation, involvement is wider in scope and can include nonmilitary concerns. However, with high-level military influence, involvement is mainly directed to the area of military concerns and security.
Fourth, the matter of reversibility. Military participation is more difficult to reverse, since its involvement in most aspects of governance can be used to hinder the reversal process. On the other hand, high-level military influence can, with less difficulty, be brought down to the normal level, particularly if the dependence of the civilian government on the military is significantly reduced.
As a caveat, however, undue influence can be used by the military as an instant platform to shift to military participation. In this case, undue influence may entice the military to make more daring moves to enhance its power.
Military control. Military control occurs when military leaders have absolute dominance in governance. This occurs with the destruction of civilian control over the military, and replacement of civilian political leaders. The military, thus, runs the government and has absolute policy-making powers. Here, the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military is no longer recognized.
Military control can take two forms: military control with or without civilian partners, respectively (Welch, 1976). The former uses of civilians as collaborators or as figurehead to project a semblance of civilian rule; in either case, the military dominates. In the latter, the military rules by itself, usually through a military junta. In whatever form, military control produces the antithesis of civilian rule, namely, the supremacy of military authority.
Obviously, military control considerably differs from military participation. One basic distinction is in governance. With military control, the military simply rules. With military participation, on the other hand, it is still the civilian leaders who govern but in partnership with the military.
Since the granting of independence in 1946, the Philippines has traditionally adhered to the democratic principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, and the only accepted mode of military involvement in politics is through military influence. The country has never experienced military control, but it experienced military participation in politics during the Marcos dictatorship, when the military was elevated as partners in governance. At present, the Arroyo government is faced with the seemingly endless political problems that bring about instability and insecurity, compelling it to consistently rely on the military. The continuing reliance, consequently, has amplified the leverage of the military over the civilian government. This dependence, in turn, has elevated the mode of involvement of the military from normal influence to undue influence. Undue influence, combined with the persistent effort of hostile groups to bring down the government, offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. This creates uncertainty— what keeps the military from entertaining the notion of going beyond the sphere of military influence?
Unwavering Military Support and the Arroyo Government
Since the politicization of the military and the destruction of civilian control during the Martial Law era, the military has always been a force to reckon with in Philippine politics. From the Marcos regime to the Estrada administration, the military and the civilian governments have demonstrated an enduring relationship. The three most palpable instances of military involvements in politics in recent history are the following: (1) During the Marcos government, the military was elevated as an indispensable partner in the dictatorial regime to perpetuate and consolidate Marcos’ hold on power. (2) In the 1986 People Power uprising, which ended the Marcos dictatorship and ushered in the Aquino administration, the military played an instigating role. Its participation, consequently, instilled among military men the popular belief that they gave democracy back to the people. (3) At the height of People Power 2, the chain of command of the military decided to withdraw support from their commander-in-chief. The action paved the way for a swift transition of power from President Estrada to Vice President Arroyo.
The unwavering support of the military to the Arroyo government has been conspicuous throughout her administration. From the beginning to the present, the military has played a central role in the survival of the government. The rest of this section shows the dynamics of that relationship as well as the prominence of the military.
First, President Arroyo, as noted earlier, was elevated to the presidency through the People Power 2 uprising in 2001. The occasion was deemed the culmination of the failure of the impeachment trial against President Estrada. The crisis began when the people started trooping to EDSA after the Senate proceedings abruptly ended. After being persuaded by retired military officers and concluding that the situation was “irreversible,” the military top brass followed suit by declaring their withdrawal of support from the Estrada government (Hernandez, 2001). With ramifications similar to those of People Power 1, the decision made by the military hierarchy in People Power 2 put an indelible military coloration on the eventful occasion. The military believed that, in both occasions, it was the pivotal factor in putting order and in installing civilian government. In assuming office through this circumstance, an occasion marked by military intervention, President Arroyo undoubtedly bears an initial debt of gratitude to the military.
Second, when many hard-core supporters of former President Estrada decided to gather at EDSA, and after some enticement from some of their leaders assaulted Malacañang Palace, the Arroyo government had to rely on its armed component— the police and the military. Although the mob was neutralized primarily through the efforts of anti-riot police, it was believed that the military waited in the wings. The military was ready to obey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to repulse the mob anytime the police failed. Here, just a few months in power, the Arroyo government again felt the value of the military.
Third, in July 2003, 323 junior officers and enlisted men, mostly from the elite services of the military, surreptitiously went to the Makati commercial district and occupied the Oakwood Premier Apartments. Known as the Magdalo group, the mutineers deplored mainly the graft and corruption in the military, demanded the adoption of the vague National Recovery Program of then Senator G. Honasan, and the resignation of President Arroyo. In referring to their actions, the group was adamant in saying that they were unplanned and spontaneous. The findings of the Feliciano Commission (2003), however, point to the conclusion that the Oakwood incident was part of a larger conspiracy to topple the Arroyo government. The standoff was resolved in favor of the government through good intelligence and the timely action taken by the military and the police, primarily by Task Force Libra. The action of the military forced the mutineers to deviate from their original plan and prevented them from linking with their civilian collaborators. The development demonstrated the recurrence of coup threats against the government, as well as the significance of the loyalty of the chain of command in ensuring the survival of the Arroyo government.
Fourth, with the breaking out of the “Hello Garci tapes” scandal, which alleged that in the 2004 presidential election President Arroyo cheated, the government’s legitimacy was put into serious question. The political backlash was immediate— a mass call for the President to resign and an impeachment complaint in the House of Representatives. The situation not only tremendously increased the number of antigovernment forces, but also provided them with an issue behind which to unite. With this backdrop, some anti-government forces, including former allies of President Arroyo (e.g., former President Aquino), took suggestive efforts to generate people power against the government. The concerted effort, however, failed; the anti-government forces were not able to produce a “critical mass.” The people that joined the mass protest were obviously fewer than those that formed People Power 1 and 2. On this volatile occasion, the military stood by the government. The chain of command made persuasive and effective efforts to preclude sympathetic military elements from joining the highly politicized event. The precaution taken by the military is somehow augmented, particularly in the publicity aspect, by the symbolic support expressed at the height of the crisis by ex-President Ramos, a former general. The continued support of the military at the critical moment greatly contributed to the survival of the Arroyo government. The debt of gratitude of the civilian government to the military indubitably became deeper.
Fifth, on the 20th anniversary of People Power, President Arroyo declared a state of emergency through Presidential Proclamation 1017. The declaration was made in response to an attempted coup. According to military intelligence, some officers, particularly Brigadier General D. Lim and Colonel A. Querubin, would launch Oplan Hackle by leading their troops to a mass rally on EDSA on the 24th of February and would announce withdrawal of their support to the government; a feat they had hoped would trigger massive defections from the military. Two days later, another incident linked to the coup attempt created tension— the relief of Major General R. Miranda, commandant of the Marines at Fort Bonifacio. To prevent the implementation of their relief order, Colonel Querubin, with some Marines, barricaded the office of the general, creating a standoff. The standoff was heightened when some prominent antigovernment personalities, including former President Aquino, attempted to go to the military base in an effort suggestive of inciting people power. Both the planned coup and military standoff were thwarted— the former, when the Chief of Staff, General G. Senga, refused the overtures of the plotters (although there were allegations that he initially dilly-dallied); the latter, when the chain of command took swift preemptory action of preventing the civilian and military elements from converging. The Arroyo administration, time and again, had to rely on the military to stabilize the precarious situation. The incident, more importantly, revealed that “during the test of loyalty, when the President crucially needed military support to defend her government, the military… stood by her” (Doronila, 2006, A22).
So far, the military has stood behind the Arroyo government. As an institution, it has kept its commitment to the commander-in-chief and to the Constitution. Because of that support, President Arroyo has been able to fend off all attempts to unseat her. Every effort conducted to undermine the Arroyo government, however, reinforces dependence— as her debt of gratitude has continued to pile up. This constant reliance, unfortunately, has profound repercussions on the civilian government, particularly on civil-military relations.
Military Influence in the Arroyo Government
As mentioned, the balance between the civilian political institution and the military should always be defined by the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, and military influence is the only accepted mode of military involvement in politics. Both the Arroyo administration and the military profess to observe the principle; however, in practice their relationship seems unclear. Although President Arroyo commands the military, circumstances have made her heavily dependent on the latter and have made her government vulnerable and susceptible to making concessions. It is hard to command people who believe that you owe them your life, so to speak.
Dr. Hernandez (2001, 72) observed “that undue influence in politics is encouraged when civilian political leadership and institutions are weak, unstable, and have a low level of popularity and/or legitimacy and/or when the military feels an overwhelming sense of power.” The prevailing unpopularity of President Arroyo, the persisting question of her legitimacy, the lingering coup rumors, and the determined effort of the opposition to remove her from office increase the clout of the military in the civilian government. In addition, the continuing presence of threats to state security brought about by the communist insurgency, Muslim separatists, and terrorist threat, ensures the relevance of the military. No doubt this makes the keen backing of the military to the Arroyo administration imperative. The downside is the amplification of the leverage of the military over the civilian government. This condition, as a consequence, seems to elevate the mode of military involvement in politics from normal influence to undue influence.
The belief in the overwhelming dependence of the civilian government, apparently, has sunk in the mind of some military personnel. The thinking could be inferred from the controversial statement made by a spokesperson of the military, who said that “we hold the nation together.” Whether a statement of fact or just plain brag, that claim seems to insinuate the tremendous dependence of the Arroyo government on the military to remain in power.
Both the Arroyo administration and the military, ironically, benefit from the arrangement— the government is assured of support and the military is guaranteed more elbowroom to operate. For the latter, the setup is ideal, since the military can be seen as operating within the bounds of the democratic framework, while at the same time maintaining a profound influence in government. One gloomy implication of this, however, is that the military top brass might expect the Arroyo administration to be soft on human rights abuses attributed to soldiers— the savior of the state must be protected by the state, so to speak. With a setup seemingly favorable to them, perhaps it is logical to assume that the military, by and large, would continue to support the Arroyo government. This arrangement, possibly, would ensure President Arroyo’s staying in office until 2010.
The easiest way to spot the increase of military influence on any administration is through material benefits. For military personnel, the benefits usually include increase in salaries, perks, allowances, and scholarships; and for the whole military organization, a secured budget and military aid package. Under the Arroyo administration, the military is deemed privileged. For instance, upon assumption to the Presidency, one of the first military reforms instituted by President Arroyo was to substantially increase the basic pay of military personnel (Hernandez, 2006). Military personnel receive a better pay than most public employees. For instance, a new graduate cadet of the Philippine Military Academy is guaranteed a starting basic salary of P17,000.00, which is way above the starting pay of a public school teacher with a master’s degree. The discrepancy is practiced despite the expressed constitutional mandate to prioritize education. Moreover, compared with other government agencies and departments, the Philippine military is usually given preference in financial allocation. For instance, President Arroyo allotted P10 billion in 2007 for the military modernization program, with a promise of more funds to come before her term ends.
Another sign of the significant increase of military influence on President Arroyo is the political appointments. Presidential appointments have strategically been used by the administration as reward for loyalty, as reward for debts of gratitude, as an instrument of appeasement, or as insurance for future support. Hence, there is the frequent appointment of retired military and police officers, mostly Philippine Military Academy graduates to either high-paying or influential government positions. On President Arroyo’s first term alone, she made the biggest number of military appointees to the civilian bureaucracy after President Ramos (Gloria, 2003). The deluge of military appointments, ironically, happened despite having a woman and nonmilitary person as President. The number of military appointments is expected to significantly increase before her term ends in 2010. If the trend continues, the increase might even exceed the appointments made by President Ramos, an ex-general. Among the military appointees in her Cabinet are General E. Ermita (Executive Secretary), General A. Ebdane (Secretary of National Defense), General A. Reyes (Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources), and General L. Mendoza (Secretary of Transportation and Communications). With the generals in the Cabinet, the influence of the military on the President is, no doubt, formidable.
Some appointments are also marred with controversy. For instance, the late General R. Wycoco, although not a lawyer or certified public accountant, was appointed head of the National Bureau of Investigation. Another instance is the seeming “militarization” of the Department of Transportation and Communications. Here, the top positions of the agency are filled by former police generals; who are also Philippine Military Academy graduates. Secretary Leandro Mendoza, a former chief of the Philippine National Police, is joined by retired Navy Officer Abraham Abesamis (commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission), former police Director Reynaldo Berroya (head of the Land Transportation Office), and former police General Thompson Lantion (head of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board) (Fernandez, 2006). The practice of appointing retired military and police officers all over the government, although perfectly legal, appears to devalue civilian authority. Despite this seemingly unpleasant prospect, President Arroyo appears resolute to sustain the military appointment policy in exchange for military support.
Moreover, she not only appointed but also allowed the expansion of the activity of the military. Early in her term, President Arroyo called for the military “to be at the forefront in her campaign to weed out poverty and take a more active role in governance” (Gloria, 2003, 15). The declaration is tantamount to allowing the military to enlarge the scope of its operations, thus, permitting it to directly encroach on traditionally civilian areas of responsibility. An example consistent with the mandate is “the Mamamayang Kawal program” of General B. Dolorfino, Commanding General of the National Capital Region. In the program, 5,000 soldiers would be embedded in the metropolis, particularly in urban slum areas, to do community services. Under the program, the military will help in disaster preparedness and prevention programs, provide free legal assistance and medical examinations, conduct education campaigns, and promote the military’s Community Development program (Alave, 2007). The work that the military will do, obviously, is beyond the traditional scope of its activity.
Pro-military policies are another area where the extraordinary influence of the military can be seen. Probably the best example here is Executive Order 464. The directive prohibits government and military officials from attending a congressional inquiry without the expressed approval of the President. As the government alleged, the directive was designed to eliminate the opportunity for antigovernment legislators to grandstand at the expense of government officials, particularly the generals. Accordingly, the directive not only protects civilian officials from interrogation in Congress; more importantly, it insulates the generals from unwarranted persecution. Clearly, this is an order that the military appreciates, considering its well-known deep-seated hatred for grandstanding politicians. The directive, however, is a provocative action by the executive branch against the legislative branch of government. It disregards the Constitution by preventing Congress, a co-equal branch, from doing one of its fundamental functions. Despite the apparent infringement on the legislative prerogative to conduct investigations, President Arroyo seemed determined to risk constitutional violation to shield her loyal defender.
In the case of Proclamation 1017, on the premise that there was a conspiracy from the left, the right, and the center to bring down the government, President Arroyo proclaimed a state of emergency. Since it is common knowledge that the declaration is a Presidential prerogative, the benefit of the doubt as to its validity thus lies in favor of the President. In implementing the proclamations, the military, however, created a predicament. In applying General Order No. 5 in particular, excessive force and some abuses are believed to have been committed— for instance, the raid and prompt closure of the office of the newspaper Daily Tribune. Here, the Arroyo administration, instead of proceeding to look into the matter, defended outright the actions of the soldiers. Such adamant support seems to indicate that the government is tolerating the abuses committed. How can you prosecute the people that neutralized the forces out to topple you?
A law that will have a profound impact in consolidating the power of the military is the Human Security Act of 2007 (Republic Act No.9372; a.k.a. the Anti-Terrorism Law). The law was passed primarily due to pressure from the United States (vis-à-vis the global war against terrorism), and the strong lobbying of the police and the military. The latter signified all-out support for the law; since they will be its main beneficiary. In theory, the law is expected to significantly improve the capacity of the armed sector to enforce security measures. By defining terrorism as the act of “sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand,” the law will make it easier for the military to tag antigovernment groups, including its main nemesis— the New People’s Army— as a terrorist group. Although a watered-down version of the law was passed by Congress, still, the enactment reflects the continuing support of the Arroyo government and her allies in Congress to the military— by leaning toward their hard-line approach to security problems.
At the moment, perhaps, the most blatant manifestation of the undue influence of the military is the apparent apathy of the Arroyo government in addressing extrajudicial killings. Nationwide killings have claimed the lives of more than 800 civilians, mostly activists, since 2001. Although not all, most of the killings are attributed to some groupings in the military. The allegation has been supported by the findings of the Melo Commission— “there is some circumstantial evidence to support the proposition that some elements within or with connection to the military are responsible to [sic] the killings.” The assumption is bolstered by the common thinking that only an extensive and armed institution like the military can perpetuate such systematic countrywide killings for so long. The factions from the left of the political spectrum, moreover, are insinuating that there could be a grand underground scheme by some groups in the military to deliberately eliminate them. On several occasions, the Arroyo administration has officially denied any involvement or toleration. It also has publicly condemned the killings; nonetheless, the public and the international community are not convinced that the government has exerted serious efforts to solve and end the killings. For instance, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights, P. Alston, has concluded that the government failed to “respond effectively and authentically to the significant number of killings” (Doronila, 2007a, 11); and a US Senate inquiry, chaired by Senator B. Boxer, concluded that President Arroyo “was not doing enough to hold military authorities responsible for the killings” (Doronila, 2007b, 1).
The continuation of the wave of killings, despite public outcry and media attention, presupposes a climate of impunity. The situation is exacerbated by President Arroyo’s open praises for General J. Palparan, who is blamed for some of the killings. It is widely believed that the only way for the government to stop extrajudicial killings is to have the political will. However, the military, intently protective of its personnel, seems to hold President Arroyo hostage. As Doronila (2007a, 11) aptly puts it: “The president faces risks if she presses the military to prosecute its own personnel for human rights atrocities and not condone these abuses. Such crackdown could erode her support… She cannot push the military too hard without provoking a mutiny. The military is the main pillar of support of her weak government.”
Despite the enormous influence of the military, it is also important to note that such influence has not reached the same level it enjoyed during Martial Law, when as partner of the dictator the military legitimately participated in governance. During the government of President Aquino, the influence of the military significantly increased due to the perennial coup attempts; nevertheless, such influence did not translate into full-fledged participation in politics.
Obviously, the military has greatly benefited from the instability and insecurity of the Arroyo administration. The weakened state of government as a consequence, has provided the military the opportunity to increase its clout in the government, with its influence rising from normal to high-level political influence. That undue influence, along with the persistent effort of hostile groups to bring down the Arroyo government, offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. However, the military has refrained from entertaining such a notion; it has confined itself and has not moved beyond the sphere of influence. This raises the question— what prevents the military from aspiring to further increase its involvement in politics from a high level influence to outright political participation, or even control?
Factors Sustaining Civilian Political Authority
Despite the dependence of the Arroyo government on the military, several neutralizing factors operate to reinforce civilian political authority and encourage adherence to democratic principles. These factors appear to dilute the military’s involvement in politics and its clout in the civilian government:
First, the consistent lack of public support for a military coup. As shown consistently by various surveys (primarily SWS and Pulse Asia), public opinion is overwhelmingly against military adventurism in whatever form against the civilian government. The results of surveys have been substantiated by the lack of popular support for military actions, from the coups in the 1980s to Oplan Hackle.
For instance, whenever Oakwood mutineer Lt. Senior Grade A. Trillanes has an opportunity to talk to the media, he always urges the Filipino people to make a decision— the public will have to make a stand either for or against the government. The young officer, unfortunately, does not realize that public apathy is already a decision— it means the public does not support or agree with the actions and methods of these young “idealistic” soldiers. This attitude has broad unanimity even among the middle class, which is deemed to be the critical segment of Philippine society.
As aptly expressed by Austero (2006) in a well-circulated open letter in the internet, “we already responded to your calls, and our response has been very clear— we chose not to heed your calls.” It is clear that the unpopularity of President Arroyo does not translate into public support for military action outside of the democratic framework. Even with a weak and dependent government, the lack of public support puts a potent restraint on future military involvement in politics. Thus, the military cannot overstep its bounds— as a warning, the Filipino public will not tolerate such act.
Second, the unwavering loyalty of the majority of local officials. Local officials, from mayors, governors, and representatives are dependable allies of the administration. The support is evident in the actions taken by local officials in defense of the Arroyo government. For instance, Mayor R. Duterte of Davao rhetorically made seditious remarks in the media annoucing his intention to declare the independence of Mindanao if President Arroyo would be ousted extra-constitutionally.
Another, at the height of the concerted call for the President to resign, wherein the call seems to be producing a domino effect, at the critical point, the majority of the local officials responded by expressing their overwhelming support to the President, either by physically trooping to Malacañang or announcing their support in the media. In the Liberal Party, Manila Mayor J. Atienza took a drastic and divisive action to wrestle the party leadership from Senate President Drilon, since the latter decided to severe ties with President Arroyo. Apparently, the move was in pursuance of the desire of some members of the Liberal Party who want to maintain their coalition with the Arroyo government.
In the House of Representatives, the overwhelming trashing of two impeachment cases against the President is probably the strongest statement of support of the allies of the Arroyo administration. Their actions flash a caveat to all antigovernment forces, including the military— despite the unpopularity of President Arroyo, her government still enjoys the unwavering support of the majority of locally elected officials. In other words, the government might be short in popularity, which is something not permanent, but long on the support of powerful and influential local politicians. Thus, equilibrium is generated: dependence on military support is balanced by the strong backing of local officials.
Third, the improvement in economic performance. Even after a military mutiny, an attempted coup plot, several bids to ignite people power, defections of many political allies and so forth, it is perplexing to see the Arroyo administration demonstrating a positive economic achievement. The economic upturn seems to sharply boost the level of confidence of the government and the business sector. Considering the improvement in economic performance from the last quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2007: stock prices surged to the highest level in nearly 10 years, the peso breached the P50.00 to a U.S. dollar barrier and continues to gain strength, the foreign exchange reserve has hit an all-time high of $23 billion, inflation is lowest in 3 years, the government budgetary deficit of P62 billion has declined for the fourth straight year, and, lastly, the government posted in 2006 satisfactory economic growth of 5.5 percent.
Despite the standard opposition reply that the growth still needs to be felt by the ordinary Filipino, undeniably, the figures strongly point to a sensible economic direction. Following the aphorism that “whoever sits does not matter as long as it could the deliver goods,” the upward economic trend will gradually generate a good public perception of the government and the military. If the government is perceived as capable of delivering the goods, then, that perception could be a persuasive factor in neutralizing the undue influence of the military. Despite the political instability, President Arroyo can say that under her administration the country has a clear economic agenda. The positive trend, hence, offers a sound rationale for the military to maintain its support to the government.
Fourth, the instituted reforms to buttress civilian control. Instituted reforms, particularly policies that promote professionalism and constitutionalism, have enhanced civilian control over the military. The reforms are grounded on the belief that military professionalism and firm acceptance of the supremacy of civilian authority are truly effective checks vis-à-vis the military (Finer, 1976). The most visible reforms are those introduced in the 1987 Constitution to reestablish civilian democratic control. Among there is the creation of oversight bodies, wherein power over appointments and promotion, power over the budget, and power of investigation were assumed by Congress (Hernandez, 2002). Another is reforms instituted under rubric of the Security Sector Reform (SSR). An important part of SSR consists of policies and programs that seek to promote democratic governance over the security sector; for instance, the creation of the Military Grievance Board, establishment of the office of internal auditor within the military organizations, and the appointment a civilian Secretary of National Defense. Moreover, these reforms call not only for upholding the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, but also for the effective functioning of institutions like the Supreme Court, media, and civil society.
As to promoting professionalism, there is a need for reorientation and value-formation programs to “reeducate” the military on democratic civilian control and military professionalism (Hernandez and Ubarra, 1999). Basic democratic tenets must be inculcated in the minds of military personnel. For instance, (1) the military must always follow the Commander-in-Chief and uphold the Constitution, regardless of who is sitting as President, and (2) the military must recognize that determining the legitimacy of a government is not its duty since, under the democratic setup, the Supreme Court is the body with the power to ultimately decide on that question. President Arroyo, undoubtedly, has benefited from past reforms. On one hand, her political weakness is compensated by other institutions that reinforce civilian control. On the other, the “reeducation” of the military, to a certain extent, has preempted any action to venture outside the sphere of political influence.
Fifth, the wisdom acquired from past dealings with the military. The wisdom acquired by the Arroyo administration from its own and past governments’ dealing with the military has provided a crucial guide for the government. In particular, the experiences have made President Arroyo astute in handling the military. Referring to the President’s survivability, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2006, A10) has described her as “one smart political tactician who has outmaneuvered her opponents at every turn.”
Not only is her government surviving, she seems to be getting smarter and stronger as time passesby. For instance, heeding the recommendation of the Feliciano Commission, the government realized that the appeasement strategy of the past, as adopted by President Ramos, is good only in the short term. To ensure a long-term solution to military adventurism, the government must resolutely move against rebellious factions in the military. This means apprehension, trial, and incarceration of subversive military personnel and officers. Armed with this knowledge, the Arroyo government seems to be determined in prosecuting suspected mutineers and coup plotters. The action enhances civilian political authority because it delivers the message that, in her administration, military adventurism will be dealt with severely.
Sixth, the historical subordination of the military. Since the birth of the Philippine Republic in 1946, the military has always been subordinated to civilian authority. Throughout the history of the country, there is no precedence of total military dominance. Even during the two most dynamic years of the military— the coup years of the Aquino administration and the Martial Law years— the military remained subordinated to civilian authority.
In the former, despite enormous dependence on military support (to survive against the series of coups) that led to increase in influence, the chain of command maintained allegiance to President Aquino.
In the latter, despite having been made a partner in the dictatorial regime, the military, during the Martial Law era was still subordinated although not to the civilian political institutions but to a civilian dictator (Hernandez, 1984). The weight of history, thus, is squarely behind the Arroyo government and against military adventurism. The fact is further reinforced in that, strictly speaking, no coup has ever succeeded in the Philippines. The dismal success rate of coups is a warning to the military not to exceed its bound, as history is not on its side.
Seventh, the anti-military regime norm. In the contemporary era, dominated by liberal democracies, the global norm is against military rule and in favor of civilian authority. Civilian, not military, government is the accepted standard of political system. As Alagappa (2001) explains: “The legitimacy problem of the military is compounded by the fact that military rule is no longer an acceptable form of government in the contemporary era.” Military rule, hence, lacks the moral right to govern and can never be legitimized. The norm ultimately sets the trend— the global decline of extensive military involvement in politics— and makes civilian control fashionable. For instance, advanced democratic countries and multilateral financial institutions, whose external support and monetary aid are essential for economic development, will be wary of helping a military state (Hernandez, 2002). Despite the dependence of the Arroyo government on military support, the external environment makes it unfavorable and unsustainable for the military to go beyond its traditional bounds. By today’s standards, to do so is repulsive to society and, in the long term, detrimental to the country as well as to the military institution.
Eighth, the development of a symbiotic relationship. The dependence of the Arroyo government on the military has developed a symbiotic relationship between the two. Ordinarily, a civilian government dependent on the military is not an ideal setup; however, the reliability of military support, when the survival of the civilian government is threatened, is always a positive note. The arrangement affords the military the opportunity to have the “best of both worlds;” it is presented the opportunity to exercise a profound political influence on the Arroyo government, while maintaining a democratic posture acceptable to modern civilian society. Although the military exerts enormous clout, it cannot be held responsible; in case of government failure, the civilian government will take the brunt of the blame. In the Philippine case, the public will always see government failure as the responsibility of the Arroyo government, not of the military. Thus, there is a premium to maintaining the relationship— on one hand, the Arroyo government has a dependable military, and on the other, the military enjoys enormous political influence behind a democratic façade, but with less or little accountability.
Lastly, the fear of dividing the military. Any action by the military to undermine civilian authority in a society that embraces democracy would be very risky. Considering the dedication and multitude of pro-democracy forces, challenging the norm can be disruptive to society and detrimental to the military as an institution. To attempt to go beyond their traditional scope of political involvement, the military faces the danger of dividing the military organization itself, since the possibility is strong that the action would generate factionalism, particularly if the pro-democratic forces within the military would counteract any move against the civilian authority.
Moreover, the worst probability for the military, in case it fails in its bid to expand power, is the total abolition of the organization, similar to what happened in Costa Rica in 1948. Thus, the price for undermining civilian authority, undoubtedly, is too high even for a highly organized institution like the military. As both a rational and conservative institution, the military is always expected to enhance its interest and preserve its unity. Following this logic, the military vis-à-vis the Arroyo government is expected to continue striving for more influence in politics without, however, compromising its unity. Perhaps, the fear of dividing the military creates an inherent mechanism of internal check, producing natural self-inhibition among the military.
Notwithstanding the political weakness of the Arroyo government and its dependence on the military— in the past and in the foreseeable future— these neutralizing factors appear to bind the military to remain within the realm of political influence. Despite the opportunity presented by circumstances to exercise more than undue influence, this level of political involvement would likely be the limit. It is improbable that the military would extend its domain to military participation or military control, as any such move would be counteracted and tamed by the factors mentioned above.
The undue influence of the military, moreover, is not irreversible. Increased influence is a consequence of the need of the times— ensuring the survival and security of the government. With the seemingly endless crises hounding the Arroyo administration, the reliance might last for some time. However, the moment the situation improves and the motivation for dependence diminishes, the military influence would revert to the normal level.
Conclusion
The persistent dependence of the Arroyo government on the military has grave implications on the relationship between the civilian government and the military institution. The circumstance, understandably, has profoundly enhanced the influence of the military, allowing its undue influence in the government. Among the manifestations of the strengthened influence of the military are material benefits, political appointments, expansion of activity, pro-military policies, and apparent apathy of the government toward human rights abuses attributed to the military.
Several factors, however, have worked for the civilian government to dilute the effects of dependence and ensure the preeminence of civilian authority. The Arroyo government has benefited from these neutralizing factors: first, the consistent lack of public support for a military coup; second, the unwavering loyalty of the majority of local officials; third, the improvement in economic performance; fourth, the reforms instituted to buttress civilian control; fifth, the wisdom acquired from past dealings with the military; sixth, the historical subordination of the military to civilian authority; seventh, the anti-military regime norm; eighth, the development of a symbiotic relationship; and lastly, the fear of dividing the military. These factors provide enough reasons for the military not to seek the level of military participation or military control, but to simply confine itself to political exercise permitted by the democratic framework. These counteracting factors reinforce the politically weak Arroyo government, ensuring the continuity of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military.
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