2012 Philippine
Quarterly of Culture and Society, vol.
39, no. 1, pp. 54-76.
Abstract
The Elite Conceptualization and
Philippine Policy Making
Over
the years, scholars have examined the intricacies of policy making in the
Philippines. The scholarships mostly showed preference for the elitist
perspective in analyzing the politics behind the policies. Political power in
Philippine society is presumed to be skewed and concentrated in one dominant
group, and that this elite controls policy making most of the time. Among the
early scholarship under this genre was the work of Carl Lande using the
patron-client framework to explain the incoherence of policies (see also Lande
1958; Lynch 1959; Hollnsteiner 1963). Lande (1965: 1) observed that “the
Philippine polity, unlike those of most present-day Western democracies, is
structured less by organized interest groups or by individuals who in politics
think of themselves as members of categories, i.e. of distinctive social
classes or occupations, than by a network of mutual aid relationships between
pairs of individuals.” These dyadic relationships involve exchanges between the
prosperous patrons and their poor and dependent clients. The political elite
that controls the government and its policy making apparatus largely comes from
those who can afford to be patron, that is those who have the wealth and the
position to do favors for large numbers of ordinary people. These have profound
consequences on policies, as the heavy reliance on vertical and horizontal
dyadic relationships steers policy making towards the pursuit of providing
rewards (e.g., special privileges, monopolies, or unwarranted exemptions),
while offering little incentives to pursue categorical programs. The
legislative program becomes more of a personal rather than ideological or
party-based program. As the overarching intention is to satisfy clientele
demands, policy making becomes continually marred by accommodations and
concessions which lead to inconsistent or aimless policies.
Some
scholars modified the patron-client framework by adopting the political machine
perspective, where material rewards rather than personal ties are the center of
analysis. James Scott (1969; 1972) declared that the traditional patron-client
relation based on loyalty and deference is being transformed into a political
machine (see also Nowak and Snyder 1970; Wolters 1984; Magno A. 1988; Magno F.
1989; Gutierrez 1994). Other scholars focused on conflict and coercion rather
than symbiotic personal ties. For instance, Benedict Kerkvliet (1977; 1995)
concluded that the amiable dyadic model is deficient in explaining the
uncongenial and antagonistic relationships that exist between people of unequal
status and class positions as well as marginalized the importance of values,
ideas, organizations and conflicts. While John Sidel (1989) asserted that the
patron-client framework fails to adequately account for the change and
continuity in Philippine rural politics as well as the role of coercion and the
autonomy of localities from central control. Although the means have changed,
from personal ties to material rewards or coercion, the implication on policy
making is the same— the political elite controls policy making and outcome to
secure political relevance and continuity.
Other
scholars used the dependency or neocolonial framework in rationalizing foreign
influence in policy making and outcome.[3]
Devotees echoed that the Philippine polity must be seen in view of the
persistence of foreign influence and control over the government (see
Constantino 1970; Lichauco 1973; Bello and Rivera 1977). The fundamental
premise assumes that the “American-given” Philippine independence in 1946 did
not totally free country from foreign domination; instead, neocolonialism
particularly in the economy was instituted (Constantino 1970; Lichauco 1973;
Stauffer 1973; Shalom 1981). By implication, the status of Filipino political
elite in shaping policies was upheld but downgraded to an accomplice of foreign
interest (especially American interest), as major policies are deemed dictated
from the outside. This interpretation presupposes a subservient domestic elite
and a policy making manipulated by external powers.
With
the redemocratization after the fall of Marcos regime, the appeal of the other
frameworks faded. [4]
Scholars began to embrace the elite democracy framework and its variants which
quickly became the dominant perspective in depicting Philippine politics. The
strength of the perspective is its inclusiveness; compared to the patron-client
framework, it takes into consideration more variables (such as corruption,
fraud, coercion and violence), and compared to the dependency framework, it
acknowledges that foreign interests at times infringes on Philippine sovereignty
but it does not suggest an exaggerated view (Kerkvliet 1995; Quimpo 2005).
Beginning with what is generally considered the pioneering work, Dante Simbulan
(1965) studying the socio-economic elites, contended that Philippine politics revolves
around the elite families. These elites, which profoundly benefited during the
Spanish and American colonial period, are resilient. As these families continue
to hold political (and economic) power, they, in effect, continuously
monopolize policy making over the years. Simbulan’s thesis was echoed by
Benedict Anderson (1988) in Cacique Democracy, as he presented an elaborate
discussion on the continuity of the elite families from the Spanish caciquism
to the American electoralism and to the present. In particular, Anderson noted
that the transformation of the caciques to political dynasties occurred during
the American colonial period when they secured the newly created elective
offices and filled the bureaucracy with their relatives and supporters, and
that this so-called “cacique democracy” continued and reached its heyday in
1954 to 1972. He further asserted that after the Marcos dictatorship cacique
democracy was restored. The traditional families again dominated the
electoral-political arena and by implication the governmental decision making.
And Alfred McCoy (1993: 10), focusing more on contemporary Philippine politics,
concluded that one of the key elements to have contributed directly to the
formation of powerful political families is “the rise of “rents” as a
significant share of the nation’s economy.”[5]
Here, McCoy’s is suggesting that the policy decisions made in the past,
specifically policies intentionally enacted to benefit the elite families, have
built up, transformed and reinforced them. In general, the Simbulan-Anderson-McCoy’s
observations on political elites are shared by many scholars who believe that
the post-EDSA politics was a reversion to the pre-Martial Law elite democracy
where political elites conveniently used elections as a relatively peaceful way
of competing and alternating political power among themselves (see Hawes 1987;
Bello and Gershman 1990; Stauffer 1990; Timberman 1991; Caoili 1993; Rocamora
1998; Teehankee 2001; Thompson 2010).
Other studies
under the elite democracy genre specifically focused on the relationship with
elite rule, particularistic policies, and development. For instance, Paul
Hutchcroft (1991) contended that the powerful and conservative elites who enjoy
autonomy from the state have resisted change. Using the concept of a
patrimonial state, where the political administration is treated as a personal
affair, he argued that the Philippine government is continually choked by
particularistic demands and actions coming from and on behalf of oligarchs and
cronies. Likewise, Olivia Caoili (1993, 2006a, 2006b), focusing on the
Philippine Congress, pointed out that having a legislature traditionally
dominated by exclusivistic political elite has a profound effect on substantive
policy making, as lawmakers tend to be more preoccupied with local bills or particularistic
legislation. In a similar vein, Shiela Coronel et al. (2004; viii), in
examining the character of the contemporary Congress, admitted the existence of
some changes in the elite-dominated Congress (such as the entry of
professionals, celebrities, media people, individuals from the middle class,
and incorporation of the party-list representatives), but, she stressed that
the legislature continues to be “an elite body that defends the interests of
the wealthy and the powerful while occasionally being open to demands from
below.” These studies demonstrated the adverse effect of the longevity of elite
rule, as elite families tend to use political power to benefit themselves and
their supporters. In policy making, this practice translates to particularistic
policies that cater to private interests rather than collective good. As aptly
resonated by the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD): “the continued control
of these families over politics and wealth is one of the most formidable
structural obstacles to democratization” and development (Gutierrez 1994: 302).
The
more recent alternative perspective— the contested democracy framework—
although it incorporates the actions of forces below (e.g., ordinary
individuals, subordinate class, marginalized communities), it still continues
to acknowledge the ascendancy of the elites in policy making (see Wurfel 1988;
Kerkvliet 1995; Franco 2001; Quimpo 2005). “The oligarchs, caciques, bosses,
and trapos are still very dominant in Philippine politics, but their predatory
rule has been challenged and continues to be challenged by the poor and
marginalized” (Quimpo 2005: 243). For example, Jose Magadia (2003),
illustrating the unevenness and inconsistencies in societal participation in policy
making, surveyed three major social policies of the Aquino administration—agrarian
reform, labor relations reform, and urban reform policies. Although the elitist
Congress still determines national policies, he argued that the higher the
level of political catalysis (the process of accelerating state-society
interaction where state and society actors send a signal of willingness to
engage each other), the greater the participation of societal organizations in
policy deliberations. More recently, Teresa Tadem (2009), discussing the
contemporary technocratic-elite control over decision-making on economic
policy, noted the continual challenge presented by civil society and social
movement. As in the formulation of the Philippine government position in the
World Trade Organization (WTO)-Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), she observed
that the experience reflects the emergence of “reformist” technocrats who are
open to negotiating with civil society actors in formulating policies. These
studies suggest that, to some extent, the forces below are moderating the elite
influence on substantive policy making.
Despite
the variations among the frameworks, overall, one common element shared by them
is— the centrality of the concept of the elite in Philippine policy making.
Patron-client involves a reciprocal relationship between elites (patrons) and
dependent clients; dependency comprises of the collaboration between the
domestic elites and imperialist elites; contested democracy includes the
challenge posed by the poor and marginalized against an elite dominated government;
and elite democracy which fundamentally consists of the dominance, alliances,
and rivalry among the elites (see Table 1). This encompassing utilization of
the concept of elites parallels the inclination of scholars towards a weak
conception of the state, as political dynamics are generally explained in terms
of the correlation between a powerful elite and a weak state. The weak
state-elitist explanation is anchored on a zero-sum relationship, where the
rise of the predatory elite results in the decline of government power, and
thus, diminishing the capacity to produce public regarding policies.
Table 1: The Centrality of the Concept of the Elite in
Philippine Polity
Political
Frameworks Depicting the “Elite”
Patron-client the reciprocal
relationship between elites (patrons) and dependent clients
Dependency the collaboration
between the domestic elites and imperialist elites
Elite
democracy the
dominance, alliances, and rivalry among the elites
Contested
democracy the challenge posed
by the poor and marginalized against an elite dominated government
The Philippine Weak State: the
Elite-Captured State and the Foreign-Dominated State
The
Philippine history is characterized by powerful political oligarchies and a
weak state (McCoy 1993). The weak state-predatory elite explanation of society
is encased in the broader weak state-strong society framework and is grounded
on two key variables: the centrality powerful Filipino families (for pioneering
studies, see Fox 1959; Grossholtz 1964; Simbulan 1965; Agpalo 1972; Green 1973)
and a weak Philippine state. The weak state-strong society framework was
popularized by Joel Migdal (1988), as he argued that third world states
weakness can be traced to powerful social forces (commonly the dominance of
elite clans) that continue to compete with the government for authority. This
makes the government ineffective in carrying out development-oriented policies
and programs. Following this logic, the Philippine weak state is more often
than not acted upon rather than being an independent actor that can initiate
and undertake reform; as important government actions, such as assignment of
privileges, is largely determined by the personal discretion of the oligarchs
controlling or holding official positions (Hutchcroft 1991; 1993; 1998).
The
Philippine weak state conception has been extensively utilized by scholars.
Temario Rivera (1991) depicted the Philippine state as captured by competing
societal interests which enjoys little autonomy from dominant social classes
and entrenched particularistic groups. Francisco Magno (1992) showed the
inability of the Philippine state to enforce its rules, particularly on forest
regulation policies. Patricio Abinales (1992) pointed out the role played by distance
(spatial and demographic factors) in tipping the balance for societal actors
and weakening the Philippine state. In another work, Abinales (1998: 158)
opined that “the caciques prospered well under the weak state structures.”
Felipe Miranda (1992) argued that the Philippine weak state is intertwined with
a structurally strong and dominant Presidency. Jose Almonte (1993) described a weak
state as unable to intervene and democratize the economy, particularly in
wresting economic control from the Filipino oligarchs. Amado Doronila (1994) argued that decentralizing
the authority and resources of the central government in favor of the local
governments are creating mutually exclusive tensions that contribute
significantly to the weakening of the state. Joel Rocamora (1998: 4)
characterized the weakness of the state as the inability of the Philippine
government “to formulate and implement a coherent economic development strategy
or to develop political institutions capable of providing a reliable regulatory
framework for the economy.” Hutchcroft (1998) portrayed the Philippine state as
a patrimonial oligarchic state, which is preyed upon by an economically
autonomous oligarchy that uses the government and its instrumentalities as the
principal means to further accumulate wealth and entrench their position.
Herman Joseph Kraft (2003) equated the growth and persistence of terrorism in
the country as indicative of a weak Philippine state, as the government is
unable to mobilize the requisite economic and political resources needed to
address the multi-faceted challenges it currently is facing. Walden Bello et
al. (2004: 4) argued that ”the American pattern of a weak central authority
coexisting with a powerful upper-class social organization (“civil society” in
today’s parlance) was reproduced in the Philippines, creating a weak state that
was constantly captured by upperclass interests and preventing the emergence of
the activist “developmental” state.” Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso (2005:
1) defined state weakness as “the persistent inability of the state to provide
basic services, guarantee peace and order, and foster economic development” and
“manifested in uncollected taxes and uncontrolled crime, bloated bureaucracies
and denuded forests, low teacher salaries, and high emigration rates.” Abinales
(2008), in his more recent work, observed that the resilience of Philippine
Presidents can be attributed to another dimension of a weak state. Although
state weakness is primarily the result of social forces expropriating state
resources and programs to advance patrimonial interests, this attitude for
plunder enables the Presidents to secure support from social forces and to
"govern;" as Presidents craft mutually beneficial compromises with
local political clans, strongmen and women, warlords and bosses and make state
largesse available in exchange for fidelity to their authority. Ben Reid (2008)
assessed that in a weak state dynamics where clientelism and semiclientilism
predominate, even civil society which is supposed to be a conditioning force is
ultimately absorbed by the clientelist relationships. And more recently, Alex
Magno (2009) defined weak state as transactional, as it responds to
particularistic political stimulus from specific constituencies, vulnerable to
political accommodation, compromises the integrity of policies to suit
immediate contingencies, and act on constituencies that are insistently noisy
rather than ideas that are fundamentally sound. Overall, these discussions
showed the overwhelming tendency among scholars of using the weak state-elitist
framework as the preferred explanation for the “negativities” (e.g., economic
debacle, bureaucratic weakness, impotency in enforcement, inability to
intervene, persistence of terrorism, and occurrence of particularistic
policies) in the Philippines (see Table 2).
Table 2: The Pervasiveness of the Weak State Thesis in Philippine Political
Literature
Scholars Utilization
of the Concept
The weak state
concept is generally used as the preferred explanation for the many “negativities”
in Philippine polity, such as:
economic
debacle,
bureaucratic weakness,
impotency in
enforcement,
inability to
intervene,
persistence of
terrorism,
and occurrence
of particularistic policies
|
Temario
Rivera (1991)
Francisco
Magno (1992)
Patricio
Abinales (1992, 1998, and 2008)
Felipe
Miranda (1992)
Jose
Almonte (1993)
Amado
Doronila (1994)
Joel
Rocamora (1998)
Hutchcroft
(1998)
Herman
Joseph Kraft (2003)
Walden
Bello et al. (2004)
Patricio
Abinales and Donna Amoroso (2005)
Ben
Reid (2008)
Alex
Magno (2009)
Even in the few
studies made in policy making, the trend continues to follow the weak state-elitist
framework. In general, the studies contend that the legislative process is
controlled and manipulated by coherent political elites, and as a consequence,
policy outcomes reflect their vested interest. For instance, Paul Hutchcroft
(who is considered to have made the most extensive studies under this genre), in
examining the politics of preferential credit policy and banking policy
respectively, maintained a state dominated by socioeconomic elites. Hutchcroft
(1993) attributed the incoherence of the credit policy to the weak and
patrimonial nature of the Philippine state, where policy is captured by special
interests resulting to the abuse of public finances and the private banking
sector. In his other work, Hutchcroft (1998) analyzing the effect of the
relationship between the state and elite families in the banking sector
concluded that because of rampant favoritism and weak state regulations, the
oligarchs were able to plunder the banking sector by abusing their loan
portfolios and engaging in cartel practices. This practice, he further asserted
persists despite regime change. Moreover, Hutchcroft, applying the concept of
booty capitalism, equated the domination of oligarchic clans to the
unpredictability and inconsistency in banking policies and the dismal state of
the Philippine economy. The archetypal example here is the well documented
“abuse” of the Philippine National Bank by the oligarchic sugar bloc (Quirino 1974;
McCoy 1988; Rivera 1994). In another study, Emmanuel De Dios (1990), analyzing
the Philippine political economy, noted the conspicuous continuity in economic
policy in the country despite the post-EDSA transition to democratic processes
and institutions. The continuance of policy from preMartial Law to post-1986,
he explained, was due to the persistence of the “old” political economy, where
the economic and political elites dominated the state’s policy making. Rivera
(1994: 20), examining the process of industrialization in the Philippines based
on the development of the domestic sector from 1950 to 1986, observed that the
persistence of protectionist policies is traceable to “the internal structuring
and class formation of the ISI (import-substitution industrialization)
bourgeoisie— its linkages with the export-landlord class, with foreign capital,
and with the state apparatus.” He concluded that the failure of Philippine
industrialization was caused by three interlinked factors: first, the control
of the landed families over the manufacturing sector; second, the alliance
between the landed families and foreign investors; and lastly, a weak state
lacking autonomy. While Caoili (1993 and 2006b), examining the post1987
Philippine legislature, observed that the homogeneity of the political elites
resulted in the persistent conservatism of Congress and the neglect of basic
issues affecting national development.
In addressing the
weak state problem in policy making, scholars usually offer a standard
prescription— the insulation of the government from the subversion of vested
interests. For example, Manuel Montes (1992) concluded that strengthening the
state means building its capacity to make economic intervention independent of
particularistic interest, where the government is capable of formulating and
implementing economic policy with sufficient autonomy from these interests.
Rivera (1994) argued that only through a strong, autonomously embedded state
can the government break the continuing power of the elites, lead a social
coalition for industrial growth, and produce economic policies that could
creatively respond to opportunities in the world market. Doronila (1994) maintained that despite the
tensions caused by devolution and localism, there is a need to build a strong
Philippine state to facilitate and promote reform. Similarly, Almonte
(2007: 119) stressed that “our most urgent need is to raise the political capacity
of the Philippine State— to set it free from the dominance of vested interest
groups and enable it to act— unequivocably— on behalf of the common good and
the national interest.” Here, political capacity refers to the legitimacy and
effectiveness of state institutions, and insuring the autonomy of these
administrative elite, that is insulating it from the importuning of
particularistic groups.
Furthermore, other
scholars such as Constantino (1970), Lichauco (1973), and Bello and Rivera (1977),
early on, focused on another dimension of the weak state conception vis-à-vis
policy making. [6]
These scholars associated state weakness to the susceptibility of government to
interference from external actors, such as foreign governments, international
organizations or transnational businesses, in making substantive policy
decisions. This is similar to the dependency framework’s thesis, their
conception associates external influence in bringing about particularistic
policies, as foreign interests are considered taking precedence in policy
outcomes. Thus, under this circumstance, the government’s capacity to legislate
public-regarding policies is significantly impaired.
Table 3: The Weak State-Elitist Tradition and Policy Making in the Philippines
Scholars Rationalization for Incapacity in
Legislating Public-Regarding Policy
Hutchcroft (1993)
Hutchcroft
(1998)
Quirino (1974)
McCoy (1988)
Rivera (1994)
Gutierrez
(1994) elite-captured state
De Dios (1990)
Montes (1992)
Doronila (1994)
Almonte (2007)
Caoili (1993 and 2006b)
Constantino (1970)
Lichauco (1973) foreign-dominated state
Bello and Rivera (1977)
In general, the
weak state-elitist literature suggests that the Philippine polity’s persistent incapacity
in legislating public-regarding policy is associated with two conditions of the
state: first, an elite-captured state where coherent political elites
continuously control policy making; and second, a foreign-dominated state where
the enduring external influence shapes policy formulation and decision (see
Table 3).
The Pluralist Perspective and Philippine
Policy Making
In
contemporary political thought, there are two dominant perspectives in
interpreting politics (i.e. the process in making political decisions)— the
“pluralists” and the “elitists” perspectives. The pluralist perspective views
the government as an arena among competing interests in society and that
policies are political decisions that reflect the acceptable equilibrium among contending
groups (see Truman 1951; Bentley 1967; Dahl 1961, 1967 and 1971; Lindblom
1977). This perspective put emphasis on diversity and competition among
political actors, as they utilize power and resources (e.g., money, supporters,
expertise, information, or connections) to influence government’s policy
decisions. On the other hand, the elitist perspective views the government as
the key entity used by the dominant group in a stratified society (i.e. the
haves and the have-nots) to advance their interests; hence, policies are deemed
as political decisions intended to serve their vested interest (see Pareto
1935; Mosca 1939; Mills 1956; Michels 1962). This perspective accentuates the
collaboration among the elites in controlling the government and its policy
decisions.
With the ascendancy
of the weak state-elitist framework, scholars have shown preference for the
elitist perspective in interpreting Philippine politics. Political power in
society is presumed to be skewed and concentrated in a privileged group rather
than spread across groups, and that this coherent political elite controls
policy making most of the time. This conventional conception, however, needs
validation. Particularly, in light of the few empirical studies in Philippine
policy making showing, that instead of a tight-knit political elites conspiring,
there is increasing diversity and competition among political elites. For
instance, Rigoberto Tiglao (1992), in explaining the politics of policy making
during the Aquino administration, contended that the elite fragmentation after
the democratic restoration has led to intense competition for political
control. As a consequence, this propelled the government towards policies that
satisfy short-term populist demands rather than long-term development-oriented
policies. Antonio Pedro (2002), studying the legislation for the liberalization
of foreign banking, focused on the existing nature of state-society and
business-government relationships. He asserted that Huchcroft’s booty capitalism
framework is incomplete, since it failed to note the changing dynamics in
policy making. He concluded that the various actors in government, business,
and civil society have acted autonomously in the legislation of the law. In a
similar vein, Eric Batalla (2002), analyzing the politics financial
liberalization in the Philippines, offered insights on the nature of state,
business-government relations, and policy making. He agreed with Pedro’s
findings that the characteristics of policy making as well as the government-business
relations in the Philippines is changing. He further contended that the
fragmentation among the political and business elites has made it possible for
the government to act autonomously and succeed in making policy change or
reform.
More recently,
Brillo (2010), analyzing the legislation and re-legislation of the anti-dumping
law, touched on the interagency competition among the governmental actors. He
observed that executive agencies saw the repeal process as an opportunity to
expand their domain and scope of authority. The issue of jurisdiction in R.A.
7843 led to a bureaucratic battle between government agencies (i.e. Department
of Finance [DOF] vs. Department of Trade and Industry [DTI]) which spilled over
to Congress, with the House of Representatives backing DOF and the Senate
supporting DTI. In another study, Brillo (2012a), examining the legislation of
the foreign investment law, analyzed the bureaucrat-politician’s dynamics in
its policy making. He argued that contrary to the weak state thesis a different
set of dynamics exist between the bureaucrats and politicians. He noted that
the bureaucrats were active, autonomous, and dominant in policy making, as they
basically determined the inputs of the discussions, the critical content of the
proposal, and most importantly, the policy outcome. On the other hand, the politicians were passive and reactive in
the lawmaking process, as they deferred to the wisdom of bureaucrats and their
participation was largely confined to fine tuning— adjustments or refinements
in the form of stipulations or exceptions to suit and placate supporters,
constituents, allies or favored interests. In the same light, Brillo (2012b),
re-examining the politics of the policy making of the foreign bank
liberalization law in the Philippines, made a fine-grained assessment of the quality
of pluralism that existed among actors in the legislation of the banking
policy. He contended that the law took a conservative form since the Senate has
a formidable alliance with the bureaucracy and interest groups (i.e. The
Senate-Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas[BSP],Bankers Association of the Philippines[BAP],
resident foreign banks bloc), as compared to the House of Representatives, and that
the internal dynamics between the Senate and the House of Representatives made
it difficult for the former to make concession while easier for the latter to
make compromises. Summing up, these studies suggest that contemporary policy
making is better viewed from the standpoint of pluralism— a political process
where a range of autonomous actors competes in influencing and defining the
policy outcome (Self 1985; Smith 1990; Howlett and Ramesh 1995).
Concluding Remarks
In
Philippine literature, the dynamics in Philippine polity, specifically, the government’s
capacity in legislating policies has been, time and again, interpreted by
scholars using the dominant weak state-elitist framework. In general, the weak
state-elitist framework presupposes that the Philippine polity’s chronic
incapacity of producing public-regarding policies is deemed the consequence of
two conditions of the state. First, the elite-captured state which refers to
the enduring control of powerful, homogenous political elites over the
government’s policy making mechanism. And second, the foreign-dominated state
which refers to the vulnerability of the government’s policy decisions to
external influences or interferences. In both cases— whether by virtue of the
elite-captured state or the foreign-dominated state— there is an adverse effect
since the governmental capacity in legislating public-regarding policies is
considerably compromised.
A small voice
among scholars has questioned the soundness and adequacy of the weak
state-elitist framework. They have pointed out that its clichéd explanation is
out of sync with the contemporary policy making experiences. By implication, the
weak state-elitist view is deemed overuse and, by taking a broad perspective,
is too general to be of much analytical use in policy making analysis (Atkinson
and Coleman 1989; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Mikamo 1997). These scholars
suggested that pluralism better characterizes present-day Philippine policy
making since there is increasing fragmentation among political actors in
legislating policies. Here, the actors are
seen as autonomous with distinct interests, resources, and power which give
rise to divergent positions across policy issues over time. Thus, in the light
of the changing nature of policy making in the Philippines, these studies imply
the need to reassess the dominant weak state-elitist framework.
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[2]
The author is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Social Sciences,
University of the Philippines Los Baños.
[3]
The ascendancy of this neocolonial interpretation of Philippine politics was
aided by the global rediscovery of imperialism and the rise of dependency
school, as well as the heavy reliance of the Marcos government on economic and
military assistance from the United States (Quimpo 2005).
[4]
For instance, scholars began to question and criticize the dependency
framework, particularly its seeming oversimplification— the absence of autonomy
of the Philippine government and the overwhelming American influence over it.
[6]
See discussion on the dependency framework.
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