Path Dependence, Increasing Returns,and Philippine Labor Migration Policy

Bing Baltazar C. Brillo

2008   Crossroads: The ASA Journal, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 24-61.

Abstract

Beginning as a temporary economic solution of the Marcos regime, the labor migration policy has persisted over the years through subsequent regimes— that of Aquino, of Ramos, and of Arroyo. For its persistence, the usual reason of poor economy has been the overly cited culprit. The study maintains this premise; however, it stresses that to fully understand the labor migration phenomenon, one must go beyond the traditional explanation of poor economy. The explanation must be able to stand in case of sustainability of labor migration in the event of economic upturn. Consequently, the study contends that there is another compelling factor— which has risen after the adoption of the policy— that produces strong incentives for persistence. It argues that the labor migration policy over time has generated increasing returns that reinforce the policy, making it path dependent. Increasing returns from the policy are manifested in (1) the phenomenal success of the policy, which makes it very difficult to discontinue; (2) the emergence of a coalition of institutions with a strong interest in preserving the status quo; (3) the adaptation of academic institutions; (4) the flexible response to changes in the international labor market; (5) the multiplier effect of the network of relatives, colleagues, and friends abroad; and (6) institutionalization of labor migration as a “culture of salvation.” The six have generated a persistent pattern that has been definitive over time on government policy decisions. Hence, the increasing returns dynamics has guaranteed the continuity of the policy beyond economics.



Introduction

Judging from past and present trends in labor migration, Filipinos truly are conquerors of the world. Filipino nurses, domestic helpers, entertainers, engineers, teachers, construction workers, and other workers are present in all corners of the globe. But the phenomenon is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it has tremendously improved the economic well-being of many Filipinos as well as the country; on the other hand, it has resulted in a depressing social hazard. Despite the accompanying adverse effects, labor migration has persisted and steadily increased over the years. Beginning as a temporary economic solution of the Marcos regime, it has been institutionalized into an enduring labor and foreign policy of the subsequent governments of Aquino, Ramos, and Arroyo.

To examine the persistence of the labor migration policy, this study uses a path dependent framework. Here, the traditional proposition that a poor economy is a pivotal factor for starting and sustaining labor migration is maintained. However, the study contends that another compelling factor has risen after the adoption of the policy. And this factor has produced strong incentives for maintaining the policy. This paper argues that the labor migration policy over time has generated increasing returns that reinforce it, making it path dependent.

As a limitation, the increasing returns dynamics considered for the labor migration policy focused mainly on the sending country. Also, the migrant worker in this study is as defined in Republic Act no. 8042: “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident.” Moreover, the term “Filipino migrant workers” will not distinguish between documented and undocumented migrant workers.

A Framework from Economics to Political Science

As a theoretical framework, the concept of path dependence gained prominence in the realm of economics via the study of technology. It has been asserted that, even though a particular technology may not be the most efficient, it can gain a decisive advantage over its competitors because of the increasing returns it generates over time (David 1985, Arthur 1994, Pierson 2000). Here, the compelling property of path dependence was equated with the increasing returns produced by the technologies; “with increasing returns, actors have strong incentives to focus on a single alternative and to continue down the specific path once initial steps are taken in that direction” (Pierson 2000, 254).

The most prominent work in technology is the classic work of David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY in 1985, where he expounded the rationale behind the dominance of the “QWERTY” keyboard from the vintage typewriter to the sophisticated computer. He stressed that the said keyboard became the universal standard due to specific “accidental” historical events that provided it with the initial lead over its competitors. And this lead was sustained until the present as a result of increasing returns— managers prefer to buy typewriters with a widely accepted keyboard design that is recognized by the majority of typists; aspiring typists seek to learn through the extensively used keyboard design (Puffert 1999). David asserted that the relation ultimately developed into a historical “lock-in” to the QWERTY system so that despite the later challenge of other more efficient keyboards, such as Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (DSK), the QWERTY design prevailed. He further argued that the design prevails because of the interworking of three features: (1) technical interrelatedness, as in the case of keyboards and typists; (2) economies of scale, as the bigger the market share the more valuable the keyboard system becomes; and (3) quasi irreversibility, as switching from one keyboard system to another entails a huge cost (David 1985, Puffert 1999).

The competition between the two video formats— VHS and Beta as illustrated by Brian Arthur in 1994, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy— provided another classic work on path dependence vis-à-vis technology. He pointed out the role of increasing returns in maintaining the market lead and developing a configuration of an “irreversible” path. The early market share lead of the VHS video format over the Beta, through increasing returns, such as the benefit of compatibility with consumers, further increased until the VHS became the standard. Here, the decision of early consumers to adopt the VHS had a significant influence on the decision of later consumers to adopt the same.

In the same work, Arthur pointed out that not all technologies have qualities that produce increasing returns. To generate increasing returns, certain characteristics must be present. He enumerated four properties of technologies that are capable of producing massive increasing returns (Arthur 1989, 1994):

1. Large setup or fixed costs. This property would generate higher pay-off, since the high costs encourage individuals and organizations to stick to it and maximize their investment through either further investments or a large production output.
2. Learning effects. Learning through time generates familiarity, efficiency, and innovations that come at a lower cost but with higher returns.
3. Coordination effects. This pertains to “positive network externalities,” which increase benefits through time if others adopt or develop infrastructure compatible with the technology.
4. Adaptive expectations. Strong incentives are based on the “self-fulfilling character of expectations.” Individuals or organizations adapt to what they believe would be the more prevalent or dominant technology in the future.

The property of increasing returns has been utilized beyond technology. It has been applied to a variety of economic contexts. Among the most prominent are the areas of economic geography, economics of trade, and economic change. As a consequence, this property has immensely broadened the expanse of path dependence in the realm of economics.

Economic geography pertains to the spatial location of production. Here, increasing returns can be seen through the “agglomeration effects,” whereby initial centers of economic activity may act like a magnet and influence the locational decisions and investments of other economic actors (Krugman 1991, Arthur 1994). This idea has been used to explain the pervasiveness of pockets of specialized economic activity (Pierson 2000).

In the economics of trade, the primary concern is the development of a highly specialized niche that gives comparative advantages to a particular country. Here, knowledge-intensive sectors are deemed susceptible to increasing returns, which would translate into a high degree of specialization (Krugman 1996, Pierson 2000). Hence, a country that gains an initial lead in a particular area would likely consolidate its advantage over time.

In economic change, the concept of increasing returns has been used to explain economic growth. In this analysis, increasing returns emphasize the significance of complementarities, where various economic activities complement other related activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Improvements in the core activity will redound to the improvement of related parts or activities, and such improvements in turn would increase the attractiveness of the core activity (Pierson 2000).

The suitability of the concept of increasing returns in the study of politics has also been examined. The preliminary link was provided by North in his Nobel Prize winning work Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. He applied the principle of increasing returns to institutions, thus, highlighting the nexus between path dependence and the pattern of institutional emergence, persistence, and change. In explaining the anomaly in the economic performance of developing countries, North (1990) argued that institutions generate a self-reinforcing mechanism that is biased in maintaining the status quo and significantly works against reversals. The arguments were built on two primary assumptions. First, that (following Arthur’s principle of increasing returns vis-à-vis technologies) increasing returns in technology is applicable to institutions. The large setup or fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations produce powerful inducements that influence the pattern of development of institutions. Second, the principle of increasing returns is not solely focused on a single institution, but more powerfully in institutional arrangements. In time, institutions establish a complementary configuration of organizations and institutions. This configuration later generates what North calls “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix,” which would warrant massive increasing returns.

Following the lead of North, Pierson fortified the utilization of path dependence and its core property— increasing returns in the realm of politics. In the article Path Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics published in 2000, Pierson stressed in detail the suitability of increasing returns in politics. The basic argument he expounded was that, compared with economics, the very nature of politics makes increasing returns more pervasive. He cited four factors of political life that generate increasing returns: “the prominence of collective activity in politics, the central role of formal change-resistant institutions, the possibility for employing political authority to magnify power asymmetries, and the great ambiguity of many political processes and outcomes” (Pierson 2000).

Pierson (2000) also supplemented the path dependence paradigm by furnishing two additional hindrances that make reversal in politics difficult. First is the short time horizon of political actors, and second is the bias of political institutions for the status quo. The former emphasized the proclivity and interest of political actors to discount long-term in favor of short-term consequences. The rationale is the logic of electoral politics, where the decisions of the electorate are taken on the short-run basis. The bias of political institutions accentuates the natural key feature in the creation and development of public policies and formal institutions— to bestow stability. Institutions are primarily designed to oppose their overturn and to bind the political actors creating them and those succeeding them. Pierson also pointed out that the two powerful correcting mechanisms in an economic system— competition and the learning process—are ineffective in the political context.

In political science, the groundbreaking work on path dependence was made by Ruth and David Collier. In their classic article in 1991— Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America— path dependence was advanced into a legitimate framework for analysis. The Colliers developed comprehensively the “critical juncture” framework. The framework has three key components: the antecedent conditions that define and delimit the range of choices of the actors; the critical juncture or the point of selection, where actors select contingent choices; and the consequence of the choice, which is the pattern or path created. The path is sustained through the so-called “mechanism of reproduction” (the effect is parallel to positive feedbacks or increasing returns), which generates institutional patterns that endure over time. This makes the path persistent and difficult to reverse.

The critical juncture framework was further utilized by Mahoney (2001) to explain the diversity of regime trajectories. In his article, Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective, he argued that “the 19th-century liberal reform period was a critical juncture that locked the Central American countries onto divergent paths of long-term development, culminating in sharply contrasting regime outcomes.” He defined critical juncture based on two categories: first, there must be alternatives on the choice points; and second, once a specific option is chosen, it becomes progressively difficult to return to the original point of having alternatives available. As Mahoney (2001, 113) emphasized, “not all choice points represent critical junctures; only those choice points that close off important future outcomes should be treated as critical junctures.”

It is important to note that path dependence does not mean permanence of the path. Whether it is a specific policy, coalition, institution, or government, “the change continues, but it is bounded change” (Pierson 2000, 265). The increasing returns or the mechanism for reproduction would make sure that the future options are narrowed and costly to reverse. However, change of path, although difficult, is possible. The change usually occurs through the intervention of an “exogenous shock,” which provides the condition that can disrupt or overwhelm the self-reinforcing mechanism of the existing path (Pierson 2000). The condition may give rise to a new critical juncture and structural pattern.

Since its introduction in political science, path dependence has demonstrated its potential as a framework for analysis. It has offered a distinct perspective of social analysis grounded on time and history. Here, “we should turn to history because important aspects of social reality can best be comprehended as temporal processes” (Pierson 2000, 264). In addition, with the suitability of increasing returns for politics, it has raised the ante; “if increasing returns processes are prevalent in politics, then there are fundamental theoretical implications. We need to change the kinds of questions we ask about politics and the kinds of answers that we generate” (Pierson 2000, 263). Finally, as a theoretical approach, path dependence has opened the door to a fertile discourse on policies— do policies continue because they serve a specific purpose, or do policies continue because they are captured by increasing returns dynamics, making change difficult.

Building on the works of the Colliers, North, and Pierson, this study continues the concept of path dependence in political science. It will try to further stretch the analytical capacity of this framework in other avenues in politics, particularly public policy. It will try to provide an in-depth assessment of the institutionalization of the Philippine labor migration policy from the past to the present. “Identifying self-reinforcing processes helps us understand why organizational and institutional practices are often extremely persistent—and this is crucial, because these continuities are a striking feature of the social world” (Pierson 2000, 265). Hence, this paper will use the path dependence framework with its core property— increasing returns dynamics— to examine the persistence of the labor migration policy.

The paper will also address two highlighted lacunae in migration literature. First, as bared by Gonzales (1998, 151), “surprisingly, few political scientists… have attempted to apply their theories and models to explain the political, policy, and administrative dimensions of this human phenomena [sic]”— labor migration. Second, as indicated by the International Labor Conference (ILC) in 2004 “migration policy is one area where future decisions are constrained by past decisions— there is strong ‘path dependency’.” Thus, the paper will offer a framework from the realm of political science to explain the Philippine labor migration policy, and it will provide literature to substantiate the claim made by ILC that the migration policy is highly path dependent.

Path Dependence: Beyond Poor Economics

It is a cliché among social scientists that the bottom line of labor migration, from the vantage of sending countries, is bad economics—the prevalence of unemployment, dire need for foreign exchange, huge disparity in population growth and economic growth, and so forth. Usually the result is an imbalance in the supply of and demand for labor in the local market. The supply will profoundly outstrip the demand, resulting in a labor surplus. To resolve this imbalance, the typical solution is to export laborers abroad, particularly to countries with a high demand for or in need of cheap labor. Hence, the poor economic performance of a country will usher in the movement of people to other places in the quest for greener pastures.

The economic dimension is widely accepted not only as the basic explanation for the trajectory of the international labor movement (particularly in developing countries), but also as the primary rationalization for the sustainability of labor migration over time. Following this logic, reversing, limiting, or halting the flow of labor migration would demand improvement of the economic stature of a country. “Where the country’s economy is unable to grow fast enough to meet the needs of its people, to sustain the growth, and to provide employment, migration is likely to occur and to continue for as long as economic conditions do not change…. With a much-improved economy, a gradual deceleration of labor migration outflows can be expected” (Go 1998, 21 and 26). Although the argument mentioned is highly tenable, it overlooks the existence of another significant factor that reinforces labor migration and works against reversal of the trajectory. Looking closely, one finds that labor migration can sustain itself! The institutionalization of the movement of labor over time can develop path dependence, a pattern where its very progression results in self-reinforcement, putting a significant premium on continuance and intensifying the cost for change.

As the cliché goes, one out of 10 Filipinos is either leaving for or working abroad. Filipino labor migration, documented or undocumented, has been accepted as an integral component of Philippine society. It would be very difficult to imagine the plight of the economy without the immense contributions of our migrant laborers. Labor migration is undoubtedly here to stay. For its conception and persistence, the usual reason of poor economics has been the overly cited culprit. However, to fully appreciate the significance of the labor migration phenomenon, one must go beyond this traditional rationale of poor economics. Since the institutionalization of migrant labor, certain factors that grew from it have worked for its persistence. Hence, the reason of poor economics must be supplemented by an encompassing reason that can sufficiently explain the sustainability of labor migration even when there is a profound improvement in the economy. “Even the changes in economic circumstances may have little effect on migration flows, since migration can respond to economic cycles in an asymmetric fashion” (ILC 2004, 115); migration can increase in an economic downswing, but not necessarily decrease in an economic upswing. For a credible explanation, there is a need to analyze the increasing returns dynamics of the Philippine labor migration policy.

Conditions Leading to the Labor Export Policy

In the first decade following its independence in 1946, the Philippines experienced relative economic success. The gross domestic product from 1950 to 1960 was 6.5 percent, the highest in Southeast Asia. At that time, the country was deemed the prototype for economic growth among third-world countries in Asia. However, the succeeding decades saw a decline in its economic performance. The Philippines found itself lagging behind the leading performers of the region, namely Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The mediocre performance signaled the incipient deterioration of the economy.

Ferdinand E. Marcos was elected president in 1965. For the most part, the Marcos regime was plagued by a plethora of serious economic problems— the failure of both the import substitution industrialization program and the export-oriented Industrialization program, the perennial balance-of-payment problem, high population growth, perennial unemployment, inflation, huge income disparity, low savings, low investments rates, and dismal growth of the gross national product. These economic woes were aggravated by the political instability created by the deteriorating peace and order situation, and the backlash against the declaration of Martial Law. With the 1973 global “oil shock” the adverse condition of the country further deteriorated. All those problems together led to massive unemployment and a dire need for foreign exchange.

This scenario put an immense pressure on the Marcos government to formulate a strategy that would cope with the crises. Confronted by the high labor force growth rate and low absorption capacity that translates into an enormous labor surplus, and the huge labor demand fueled by petrodollars in the Middle East, the government opted to adopt a firm policy on exporting labor. “Accordingly, the Marcos Administration saw this as an opportunity to adopt a labor export policy that would help ease the burden of the problems” (Gonzales 1998, 34). This major government policy was specifically designed to address not only the worsening problem of unemployment but also the country’s need for foreign exchange during the period (Cariño 1998). The policy was considered a temporary solution that would cease when economic improvement is attained. The rationale was that a vibrant economy would lead to the rise in the level of wages, and increase the local demand for labor and absorption of the oversupply. Hence, the combination of economic instability, political uncertainty, and overseas opportunity provided the initial impetus for the labor migration policy.

The Labor Export Policy of the Marcos Regime

In 1974, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 442 or the Labor Code, which served as the basis for the overseas employment program. The main agenda of the program “was to promote overseas contract work and reap whatever economic benefits could be gained from the outflow, especially in terms of foreign exchange and employment”(Gonzales 1998, 119). Article 17 of the Labor Code states:

An Overseas Employment Development Board is hereby created to undertake, in cooperation with relevant entities and agencies, a systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers in excess of domestic needs and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. It shall have the power and duty to

1. promote the overseas employment of Filipino workers through a comprehensive market promotion and development program;
2. secure the best possible terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers on a government-to-government basis and ensure compliance therewith;
3. recruit and place workers for overseas employment on a government-to-government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate; and
4. act as secretariat for the Board of Trustees of the Welfare and Training Fund for Overseas Workers.

The provision manifested the determination of the government to take advantage of the surplus labor and the open overseas market. “With supply and demand factors converging, the Philippines was ripe for large-scale labor migration, an opportunity the Marcos government recognized” (Asis 2006, 3).
The Marcos regime not only concretized labor migration into a fundamental law; it also made the policy a government mandate.

To supplement the labor migration policy, the Marcos regime launched a new foreign policy called Development Diplomacy. Here, “Marcos thought that he could use the Philippines’ surplus manpower and the high demand for labor from oil-producing countries to show to other developing nations the virtues of interdependent development” (Gonzales 1998, 34). According to Tyner (2004, 32), the policy emerged as an opportunity to satisfy a variety of goals.

1. Overseas employment was expected to reduce the levels of unemployment and underemployment.
2. Overseas employment was presumed to improve the stock of human capital, as workers returned with skills acquired from abroad.
3. Overseas employment was expected to promote Philippine development and alleviate the balance-of-payment problems through mandatory remittances.

To further accelerate the outflow of labor the Marcos regime, through Presidential Decree no. 1412, formally ended the government monopoly and allowed the private sector to participate in facilitating overseas employment (Tyner 2004). This resulted in a tenfold increase in licensed private agencies catering to Filipino migrant workers. The decree ushered in the government-private sector partnership in promoting labor migration. The former assumed regulatory functions, while the latter focused on the day-to-day recruitment and placement activities (Tyner 2004). The involvement of the private sector made the process more efficient, resulting in sharp increases in overseas employment.

In the Marcos era, more importantly, the government laid the fundamental institutions for labor migration. Several offices and government agencies were set up or designated to function in relation to the labor export policy. Among the most prominent are the Overseas Employment Development Board and the National Seamen Board, which would later become, respectively, the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Association (OWWA). POEA is primarily responsible for processing migrant workers and regulating private recruitment agencies as well as promoting and monitoring overseas employment. OWWA, on the other hand, is tasked mainly to provide support and assistance to safeguard the welfare and interest of migrant workers and their families.

Since the adoption of the labor migration policy in 1974, there has been a steady increase in the number of Filipino workers leaving for abroad annually: there were 379,823 Filipino migrant workers in 1975-79, 1,580,306 in 1980-84, 2,129,925 in 1985-89, and 3,817,829 in 1990-95 (Go 1998). The policy also gave the government a novel and reliable source of foreign exchange. Parallel with the increase in the number of migrant workers, the flow of remittances also continued to increase every year. In the first 10 months of 2005, remittances coursed through the banking system reached $8.832 billion, a significant increase from $6.947 billion for the same period in 2004 (Go 2006).

Although there had been prior labor migration policies, the labor export policy of the Marcos regime was distinct. In previous policies, government intervention in the export of labor was minimal. Before the 1970s, labor export was permitted but not encouraged (Tyner 2004). The Marcos regime conducted a deliberate, resolute, and systematic effort to promote overseas employment. This marked the onset of the period when the government became the active and main promoter of Filipino labor abroad. “It was the state's intervention in promoting overseas employment that accounts for the significance of labor migration from the Philippines, making it amongst the top labor-exporters in the world” (Rodriguez 2002, 4).

The policy in the Subsequent Regimes of Aquino, Ramos, and Arroyo

The 1986 people power uprising ended the Marcos regime and installed Corazon C. Aquino as president. As the consequence of a mismanaged government, the economy that she inherited was in the midst of the deepest recession of the postwar period (De Dios and Hutchcroft 2003). It was a government with a very weak financial condition, and this condition worsened because of the several coups d’etat launched against the Aquino government. The economic and political instability of the government was put into question, and local and foreign investors were discouraged from investing in the country. Lack of foreign investments severely limited the flow of the much-needed foreign exchange and the capacity of the government to create jobs. The Aquino government was in a predicament, since it had to contend with two pressing issues: to pay off all foreign debt obligations of the country (which it vowed to do) and to make a dent in improving the lives of Filipinos by addressing the perennial unemployment problem. As the pressure mounted, the government was obliged to continue the successful labor migration policy of its predecessor. The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan for 1987-92 of the Aquino government stated:

1. Overseas employment will continue to provide interim employment until such time that the domestic economy can generate enough jobs.
2. Labor market facilitation for both local and overseas workers shall be improved to bring people and jobs together.
Thus, the Aquino government magnified the scope of the labor migration policy. For instance, Tyner (2004) cites the adoption of a “discriminating marketing approach” geared to penetrate nontraditional markets that are either skill-based or geography-based. Furthermore, through the recommendation of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), diplomatic missions were established to strengthen existing ties with destination states and to better respond to the growing needs of migrant workers. “A more vigorous marketing strategy for Filipino overseas employment was pursued. Working abroad was made more accessible. Regional POEA offices were set up. Marketing missions were sent abroad to look for more employers of Filipino labor. The target then was to deploy half a million Filipino workers every year” (Valencia 2003).
Through Executive Order 247 POEA was reorganized. Its functions— the regulatory function and directives for the protection of migrant laborers— were expanded to respond to changing markets and economic conditions. POEA received a direct mandate to maintain an adequate supply of surplus labor. The government actively enticed more citizens to seek employment abroad or emphasized job training suitable for the labor market abroad. Furthermore, to highlight their significant contribution to the economy, President Aquino honored the migrant workers with the title “modern-day heroes.” Consequently, labor migration significantly increased during the Aquino administration. Based on POEA records, the number of Filipino migrant workers grew from 449,271 in 1987 to 686,461 in 1992, with an average 11.29 percent annual growth rate. The policy persisted even during the transition from a dictatorial regime to a democratic one.
In 1992 Fidel Ramos won the presidential elections with a narrow margin. The Ramos government immediately ventured on an ambitious economic program. “Under the banner of ‘Philippines 2000’— a rallying cry to join the ranks of newly industrializing countries by the end of the century— Ramos combined measures of economic liberalization, privatization, and infrastructural development with concerted attacks on ‘cartels and monopoly’”(De Dios and Hutchcroft 2003, 55). The government was relatively successful in its main economic strategy and on other fronts— solving the serious power shortage, improved tax collections, peace agreements with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and pacifying military adventurism. Its success inspired confidence among the population and members of the international community. The influx of local and foreign investments began. The government welcomed the prospect of reversing the perennial budgetary deficits; in fact the country experienced budgetary surplus in 1994 and in 1995. Despite the economic gains, however, unemployment continued to plague the country. And this condition was aggravated when the 1997 Asian financial crisis struck the country.

To address the unemployment problem, one of the key strategies utilized by the Ramos government was to continue the labor migration policy of the previous administration. As President Ramos declared: “Overseas employment remains a strategic development program of our government; the overseas employment program is a major pillar of national development; generates invaluable foreign exchange which is necessary to fund development and strategic programs; helps rectify world imbalances of income and human resources” (Tyner 2004, 40). As did the Marcos and Aquino regimes, the Ramos administration held the view that the labor migration policy was temporary and would be phased out when the local economy improved. Ironically, the government anchored the policy to its long-term economic development strategy, as the policy was deemed a vital component for the Philippines to acquire the status of a newly industrializing country.

In 1995, however, several cases involving migrant workers abroad raised questions about the labor migration policy. The most celebrated cases were those of Flor Contemplacion and Sarah Balabagan. Contemplacion, a domestic helper in Singapore, was charged with the murder of another Filipino domestic helper and a 4-year-old Singaporean boy. In the United Arab Emirates, Balabagan, then a 15-year-old domestic helper, was charged with the murder of her 85-year-old employer. Both cases captured the sympathy of the Filipino public, and led to the clamor for change in the labor migration policy. Considering their huge contribution to the economy, the people called for the utmost protection of migrant workers.

Feeling enormous pressure, the Ramos government took steps to enhance the welfare of migrant workers. It drafted and passed Republic Act 8042, known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The law stipulated the expanded responsibility of POEA in issues concerning migrant workers.

• Guarantee migrant workers rights.
• Deregulate POEA regulatory functions.
• Apply stricter rules on illegal recruitment activities and the corresponding penalties.
• Make deployment selective.
• Repatriate of workers.
• Develop a reintegration program.
• Share government information with and extend other basic assistance to OFWs and their families.
• Use information technology to facilitate dissemination of labor market information.
• Expand a grassroots outreach education program to enable potential OFWs to arrive at informed decisions.
• Use a one-country team approach to synergize services to OFWs.
• Restructure systems for disposition or adjudication of cases relating to overseas employment.
As stated by the DFA, the law provided “the framework for stronger protection of Filipino workers abroad, with the creation of the Legal Assistance Fund and the Assistance-to-Nationals Fund, and the designation in the DFA of a Legal Assistant for Migrant Workers’ Affairs, with the rank of Undersecretary.” It also purported a renewed mandate in the overseas employment program, from exporting labor to managing labor outflows (Go 1998).
However, the policy intentions on labor migration were deemed vague. Republic Act 8042 specifically states that the government does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development, but the magnitude of labor migration reveals otherwise, and that the government has a deliberate labor export policy (Batistella 1998, Cariño 1998). Furthermore, statistics from financial institutions, such as World Bank, NEDA, and Department of Finance shows that the labor policy remains an essential component of the economic program of the government. Hence, despite issues over the peril and social cost of migration, R.A. 8042 did not reverse the pattern of the labor migration policy.
The Ramos regime further reinforced labor migration by declaring that migration was an expression of the right of choice and freedom of movement. Because it is a natural right, any action to restrain the movement of individuals would be deemed a violation of human rights (Tyner 2004). The Ramos government thus legally justified its commitment to encourage labor migration. According to POEA, the number of Filipino migrant workers grew from 696,630 in 1993 to 831,643 in 1998, with an average annual growth rate of 3.515 percent.

Gloria M. Arroyo became president, first through extraconstitutional means— People Power 2 uprising in 2001— and second through the 2004 presidential election. In both cases, her ascendancy to the presidency was tarnished by the question of legitimacy. In the former, ex-President Estrada and his supporters charge her with usurping political authority, and in the latter, her critics insinuate, through the “Garci tape” scandal, that she cheated in the elections. However, despite the persistent legitimacy problem and its complications (e.g., coup threats, impeachment threats, terrorist threats, and so forth), surprisingly, the Arroyo regime has not only survived, but managed to make incremental economic gains. “In terms of macroeconomic management, the country even appeared to regain a semblance of balance… the budget deficit was kept under control…, inflation continued on a downward path…, and pressures on the peso abated, allowing interest rates to be reduced” (De Dios and Hutchcroft 2003, 66). One ramification of this positive development was the increase in employment. However, this increase has not translated into an equivalent decrease in unemployment. For instance, in 2001 employment grew by 6.2 percent, while unemployment remained unchanged at 11.2 percent. (Go 2002)

As in the previous regimes the Arroyo government adopted the labor migration policy as part of the overall strategy in addressing the unemployment problem. As stated in her Mid-Term Philippine Development Plan for 2001-2004:

Overseas employment remains to be a legitimate option for the country’s work force. As such the government shall fully respect labor mobility, including the preference of workers for overseas employment. Protection shall be provided to Filipinos who choose to work abroad and programs to effectively reintegrate them into the domestic economy upon their return shall be put up. Better employment opportunities and modes of engagement in overseas labor markets shall be actively explored and developed, consistent with regional and international commitments and agreements (Tyner 2004, 51).

Although the plan generally exhibited continuity of the policy, there were also some modifications. The government does not anymore portray migration as a natural process, but as something that is supported and controlled, not simply managed (Tyner 2004). “Thus, from managing the flow, the government now seeks to actively promote international labor migration especially of higher skilled, knowledge based workers, as a growth strategy” (Go 2002, 351).

The preeminence of the labor migration policy was apparent in two recent issues faced by the Arroyo adminisration concerning international labor migration. First, the response of the government to the abduction and eventual release of truck driver Angelo de la Cruz clearly manifested the enormous importance of migrant workers. Fearing more the public backlash than objections from the United States and other allies, the government abruptly removed its contingent troops in Iraq to secure de la Cruz’s release. Second, President Arroyo announced “the upgrading of skills and knowledge of Filipino domestic helpers who want to work abroad so that they can become what she described as ‘supermaids.’ The move is said to address the economic dislocation brought about by the evacuation of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) deployed to war-torn Lebanon” (Arao 2006, 1). Moreover, as Asis (2006, 7) pointed out, the government has also become a leader in introducing migration-related laws in Asia and in enlisting with international accords on migration. Relevant documents and the action on them include the following:
• passed the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, which establishes policies and institutional mechanisms to provide support to trafficked persons;
• passed the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, which gives qualified overseas Filipinos the right to vote in national elections;
• passed the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, which allows for dual citizenship;
• as of October 27, 2005, ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families; and
• as of November 6, 2005, ratified the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.
The Arroyo government in acting as the primary promoter of labor migration adopted four key strategies: employment generation, employment preservation, employment enhancement, and employment facilitation (Go 2002). The strategies proved to be effective in sustaining the trend. In 2005 the number of deployed overseas workers increased by 5.4 percent reaching 685,485, and remittances were estimated to reach a whopping $10.85 billion (Go 2006).

Increasing Returns and the Labor Migration Policy

The labor migration policy has been an important component of Philippine society over the last 30 years. With the steady increase in the number of migrant workers, labor migration has been concretized in an open-ended policy. From Marcos to the Arroyo administration, the policy has become a permanent arrangement in government. This persistence has always been attributed to the migration pressure brought about by poor economics. As Cariño (1998) observed, in the light of the continuing social and economic problems facing the country, it is almost certain in the foreseeable future that the government would rely on the export of Filipino laborers to cope with unemployment and balance-of-payment problems. Over the years, however, poor economy has not been the only driving force that sustains the policy. Another critical factor has emerged and gives strong incentives for the policy’s sustainability— the increasing returns dynamics. Increasing returns have significantly closed down the option to replace or reverse the policy, making it path dependent. Over the years the government has become increasingly bound to maintain the path.

The following are the principal manifestations of increasing returns on the labor migration policy:

First is the phenomenal success of the policy. The policy was very successful on two fronts: remittances and employment. From its inception to the present, the labor migration policy has consistently provided the government with a reliable source of foreign exchange. The remittances had increased tremendously from $103 million in 1975 to close to $13 billion in 2006. Since the Marcos regime, the policy has been elevated to a vital component of the economic program of all administrations. For instance, in both 2004 and 2005, the remittances covered the annual foreign debt amortization, which had previously not been the case (Montinola 2006). With regard to employment, the policy throughout has provided tremendous job opportunities to Filipinos. Since the local economy is incapable of absorbing the millions of Filipinos working abroad, any reversal of the policy would mean massive unemployment. The idea that the labor migration policy is a built-in safety valve has bred complacency and a feeling of security within the government. “The Philippines has become so successful as a labor exporter that it has failed to develop and strengthen development processes”(Asis 2006, 9). Furthermore, in this era of globalization the government realizes that migrant workers constitute the utmost comparative advantage of the country (Wehrfritz and Vitug 2006). This view has helped strengthen the resolve of any government to continue the policy.

Second is the emergence of the coalition of institutions with a strong interest in preserving the status quo. There are supplementary institutions, whose existence or distinct functions were brought about by the labor migration policy. The category includes what Tyner (2004) calls the “Philippine state migratory apparatus.” This refers to government institutions and organizations that exercise state power over migration (e.g., POEA, OWWA, DFA). The category also includes private organizations connected with labor migration, for example, the banking system, academic institutions, interest groups, and thousands of recruitment agencies. These institutions by themselves or through their complementary configurations would be critical of a change in policy, for such a change would compromise their vested interests, which include maintaining their significance, earnings, or existence. For instance, the “growth of a new ‘migration infrastructure’ in the form of recruitment companies, labor and construction contractors, travel agencies, schools and training centres, and medical clinics for health certification— along with remittance agents and foreign exchange brokers to transfer funds home. These companies can constitute a multi-billion dollar industry that has strong vested interest in the continuation of labor migration” (ILC 2004, 116).

Third is the adaptation of academic institutions. The implementation of the labor migration policy has generated a profound effect on academic institutions. With the surge in migrant workers, academic institutions have developed “adaptive expectations.” This means that they adapted their future development to what they believe would be an enduring government policy and thus capitalize on the phenomenon. One evident effect is the proliferation of both public and private schools that offer courses primarily designed to cater to employment demands abroad. This arrangement has resulted in a mismatch between the graduates and the need of the local labor market. Hence, the longer the policy exists, the more profound will be the gap between labor supply and demand in this country. The situation will surely look to an external market to absorb the excess supply of labor and will justify the continuation of the labor migration policy into the future.

Fourth is the flexibility to adapt to changes in the international labor market. The labor migration policy has shown that it can easily adjust to meet the demands of the international labor market. Over time, the supply side of labor migration has acquired “learning effects.” The long experience with the policy has widened the alternatives and connections available to the government and migrant workers, thus providing more avenues for the sustenance of the policy. This is clearly seen in the policy’s adaptability to changes, whether in demand, type of services, or gender makeup brought about by the very fluid environment of the international labor market. As Go (1998) observed, in a 20-year period (1975-1995) there had been significant shifts in Filipino labor migration. Among the prominent shifts are the (1) increasing prominence of Asia as a work destination in the nineties, (2) increasing demand for service workers and reemergence of the need for production workers and those in related fields, and (3) increasing feminization of labor migration. The trend has continued to the present. In 2000 labor migration to Korea and Hong Kong declined. To compensate, migration to Singapore significantly increased and there was surge of nurses going to England (Go 2002). The flexibility exhibited by the labor migration policy over time has fortified the endurance of the policy. “Filipino society has become migration-savvy, having developed the ability to respond and to adjust to the changing demands of the global labor market” (Asis 2006, 10).

Fifth is the multiplier effect of the network of relatives, colleagues, and friends abroad. The millions of Filipinos currently working abroad and the high probability of one’s having relatives, colleagues, or friends abroad make labor migration more certain and relatively less stressful. Over time, labor migration has developed concrete linkages, connecting Filipinos to individuals in other countries. These linkages have provided advantages to potential migrants: for instance, the offer of a place in which to stay, the giving of referrals for work, guidance and protection, financial support, and so forth. Moreover, the linkages are supplemented by advances in technology and communication (e.g., emails, chat, text messaging, and so forth) where “connecting” with people anywhere is very easy. This relative ease of access abroad through a social network has resulted in a multiplier effect, assuring future increases in labor migration and ensuring the sustenance of the policy.

There seems to be unanimity on this: irrespective of the school of thought on labor migration, all scholars agree that the social network is a crucial factor for sustaining migration over time (Portes and Bach 1985, Massey et al. 2002, Portes 2006). Consider the following facts.

• The network of relatives and friends developed through the years, both locally and abroad, helped minimize the risks involved in working abroad by providing information, credit, and social support (Go 1998).
• Once migration connections have been established, the presence of relatives, friends, and/or others from the same community of origin may give one a strong incentive to choose a particular destination (Thielemann 2004).
• Not only do social networks link migrants with their kin and communities in the sending countries; they also link migrants to employers in receiving areas. These ties underlie the emergence of such phenomena as chain migration, long distance referral systems to fill job vacancies, and the organization of a dependable flow of remittances back to the sending communities (Portes 2006)
• Even without government involvement, labor migration from the Philippines likely will persist, thanks to social networks, social capital, and social remittances that have flourished (Asis 2006,10).

Last is the institutionalization of labor migration as a “culture of salvation.” Through the years, the Philippines has developed a culture of emigration, which gives a high value to living or working abroad (Go, 1998). Nationwide surveys in 2002 found that one out of five Filipinos desires to migrate to other countries. Another survey conducted by Pulse Asia in 2005 found that a substantial number (60 percent) of the children of migrant workers affirmed that they had plans to work abroad, and that an increasing number of Filipinos intend to leave the country if given the chance (Asis 2006). With a proven track record for monetary gains and social mobility, the labor migration policy has developed among Filipinos the mind-set that working abroad would be the fastest and most effective way to get out of poverty or move up in social status. This aspiration has captured the imagination of most Filipinos to whom better living standards are synonymous with working outside the country. With labor migration deemed as the time-tested formula for success, broad acceptance of the policy into the future has been assured.

The increasing returns dynamics is moreover strengthened by the “natural” increasing returns occurring in policy decision-making, such as the short time horizon of politicians, the prominence of collective activity, the ambiguity of many political processes and outcomes, and the possibilities for magnifying power asymmetries (Pierson 2000). For instance, all regimes have benefited from labor migration through positive feedbacks— from ensuring financial viability to as simple as projecting a positive image of the government (e.g., addressing unemployment). Hence, the Arroyo administration would surely not want to prejudice itself by removing or changing a policy that has given ample benefits to past regimes and from which it has also itself gained. Let some other regime in the future do it. And so, the policy is bound to remain with the present government and others yet to come.

The increasing returns dynamics has restricted government actions and at the same time placed a premium on the policy’s maintenance. It is so persistent that, even in the presence of economic improvement, it offers a viable explanation for the steady increase in labor migration, placing the continuity of the policy beyond mere economics.

Conclusion

Dealing primarily with the dual problems of unemployment and financial imbalance, the Marcos regime set forth an outbound-oriented policy for labor migration. Initially considered a temporary solution, the policy over time has been institutionalized by economic pressures and increasing returns dynamics. Manifestations of increasing returns in the labor migration policy can be seen in the following: first, its remarkable success makes it very hard to discontinue; second, institutions with vested interest for maintaining the policy have developed; third, the academe has shown conformity; fourth, the policy has adapted to the vagaries of the global labor market; fifth, social networks have a multiplier effect; and lastly, a mind-set of the “culture of salvation” has developed. All have led to the creation of a persistent pattern that has been definitive in government policy decisions on labor migration. As a consequence, the labor migration policy of Marcos, Aquino, Ramos, and Arroyo has been bound by the pattern.

Although a change of policy is a possibility, it has not been regarded as a highly attractive option. Since the pattern has been deeply reinforced and institutionalized, deviating from it would be impractical and costly for any regime. It is difficult to imagine any major change of policy in the foreseeable future. Despite some attempts to dilute the magnitude of the labor migration policy, the logical conclusion would still be the same— at present the path is too strong to alter. With the improvement of the economy, it is probable that the Filipino labor migration will diminish. However, this would not be absolute— the increasing returns dynamics that has been working for a long time would ensure that the policy would persist and continue to be significant notwithstanding an economic upturn.

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Keywords

Migration Policy, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence,
Labor Export, Filipino Labor Migration

The Arroyo Government and the Military: Maintaining Civilian Authority amidst Undue Influence of the Military

Bing Baltazar C. Brillo

2008   UPLB Journal, vol. 6, no. 1, pp.115-128.

Abstract

In the contemporary democratic framework, the supremacy of civilian authority over the military is a fundamental and revered principle. Following this, the only accepted mode of involvement by the military in politics is through military influence. In the Philippines, however, with the seemingly endless political problems hounding the Arroyo administration, applying the principle appears problematic. From President Arroyo’s unconventional ascension to office to the lingering question of legitimacy in her second term, the keen backing of the military for her administration is, no doubt, imperative. Consequently, the continuing reliance of the Arroyo government on military support has amplified the leverage of the military over the civilian government. This condition, in turn, allows the mode of involvement of the military to move from normal influence to undue influence. The military’s undue influence, along with the persistent effort of hostile groups to bring down the Arroyo government, offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. Such a notion, however, seems restrained, since several neutralizing factors reinforce civilian political authority and encourage adherence to democratic principles.

*The author acknowledges the comments of Dr. Carolina Hernandez (on the initial draft) as well as the anonymous reviewers but assumes full responsibility for the final manuscript.


Key Terms
Civilian-Military Relations, Military Influence, Civilian Authority


Introduction
In People Power 2, the Arroyo government started on the wrong footing. On judgment day before the mammoth crowd that had assembled in EDSA, the military reportedly decided to participate in politics. It did not maintain its nonpartisanship; instead, through the cunning stroke of its top brass, it withdrew its support from the Estrada government. The action of the military in backing up the initiative of the people has had dire consequences on the establishment of democratic civilian control. It exposed the successor, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, to excessive and unwarranted influence from the military and weakened the institutionalization of civilian authority (Hernandez 2001). The event gave the military undue influence over the civilian government and reactivated the dynamism of military involvement in politics.

With the seemingly unending political problems hounding the Arroyo administration— among the prominent ones are the persistent question of legitimacy, her unpopularity, the annual threat of impeachment, the clamor for her to resign, and the persistent coup threats— the crisis is bound to continue. Consequently, this guarantees the continuing dependence of the civilian government on military support, which ultimately gives rise to profound leverage of the military over the government.

This study assesses the role that the military plays in contemporary politics in the Arroyo government. It argues that the resulting dependence of the civilian government on military support elevates the political clout of the military to undue influence. Such undue influence offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. However, such a notion, even if it is entertained by the military, appears to be tamed by several factors operating favorably for the civilian government. To explain the situation, the framework of analysis on the levels of military involvement in politics in the context of civil-military relations is first presented. Second, the dependence of the civilian government on unwavering military support is examined. Third, the manifestations of increased military influence, in relation to the political weakness of the government, are highlighted. Lastly, the factors that neutralize the military’s undue influence and sustain civilian political authority are identified and explained.

Framework of Analysis
The contemporary democratic framework typically describes civil-military relations as the balance of power between the civilian political institution and the military institution. The civilian political institution is represented by the elected chief executive of the government who, as commander-in-chief, exercises administration and supervision control over the military. The military institution, on the other hand, is represented by the highest-ranking military officers, who, by virtue of the extremely hierarchical organization, make decisions on behalf of the whole institution. The relationship between the two institutions has been delineated by the long-standing democratic principle of a modern state— supremacy of civilian authority over the military. The military institution, hence, with all its might, is at all times subordinated to civilian authority.

As the ultimate defender of the state and its people and the foremost symbol of nationalism, however, the military cannot absolutely be shut out of politics. By possessing power, primarily through organizational superiority and monopoly of the use of force, it is impossible for the military not to have a political role. Following this premise, the only question is the degree of involvement of the military in politics. The involvement can be viewed through a continuum— from military influence to military participation to military control (Welch, 1976).

Military influence. For most democratic states, military influence is the normal and accepted mode of involvement of the armed forces in politics. The mode is characterized as follows: (1) involvement in politics is limited to the top brass of the chain of command; (2) there is a clear and integral divide between military and political roles, and the officers for the most part confine themselves to the former; (3) political influence is exercised through constitutionally accepted channels; and (4) interactions between the military and civilian political leaders transpire at the top echelon of the military hierarchy (Welch, 1976). Under all categories, moreover, the military openly accedes to the supremacy of civilian authority. Consistent with this, the military confines itself to lobbying, providing information, and offering expert advice to the civilian political leaders. Here, the advice given has a substantial persuasive effect, not because it is anchored on brute force, but because it carries the weight of expertise (Welch, 1976).

To supplement the classification of Welch, military influence can be further categorized as having normal and high levels. At the normal level, military influence on civilian political leaders, as mentioned earlier, is reinforced by a stable and secure civilian political institution. Being stable means that the existence of the government is not threatened, while being secure refers to the presence and effective operation of civilian control (e.g., investigative, appointive, and budgetary powers) over the military. In this arrangement, the government neither feels beholden to, nor manifests civilian dependence on the military.

At the high level of influence, on the other hand, the military has a strong clout over the civilian political leaders when the civilian political institution, although functioning, is unstable and insecure. Here, the existence of the government is threatened, and civilian control over the military is weak. The arrangement creates heavy reliance on the military, and results in dependence of the civilian government. This condition gives more leverage to the military, elevating its mode of involvement from normal influence to undue influence. Although the undue influence of the military is technically acceptable in a democratic framework, it still presents dangers to the civilian authority. The military is faced with the temptation and afforded the opportunity to entertain other avenues to further increase its power and influence.

Military participation. Military participation as a mode of military involvement in politics differs in degree from military influence (Welch, 1976). With military participation, civilian political leaders share political decisions with the military leadership. Power-sharing usually comes about through the initiative of civilian political leaders, who entice the military to help them keep their hold on power, or when civilian political leaders fear being displaced from office by the military, or when inexorable pressure comes from the military. The latter could take the form of hints and actions that range from barely constitutional to serious threats, intimidation, or blackmail, which are unconstitutional (Finer, 1976).

Military participation and high-level military influence differ markedly in the intensity of military power in politics. The fundamental distinction is manifested on four aspects.

First, involvement in political decision. With military participation, there is direct involvement in decision making. With high-level military influence, on the other hand, there is indirect involvement in decision making although the influence carries enormous weight.

Second, adherence to the supremacy of civilian authority. With military participation, the military may become equal partners of civilian political leaders in governance, thus significantly diluting civilian supremacy. With high-level military influence, on the other hand, the supremacy of civilian authority over the military is maintained despite government instability, and civilian dependence that results in undue military influence.

Third, extent of involvement. With military participation, involvement is wider in scope and can include nonmilitary concerns. However, with high-level military influence, involvement is mainly directed to the area of military concerns and security.

Fourth, the matter of reversibility. Military participation is more difficult to reverse, since its involvement in most aspects of governance can be used to hinder the reversal process. On the other hand, high-level military influence can, with less difficulty, be brought down to the normal level, particularly if the dependence of the civilian government on the military is significantly reduced.

As a caveat, however, undue influence can be used by the military as an instant platform to shift to military participation. In this case, undue influence may entice the military to make more daring moves to enhance its power.

Military control. Military control occurs when military leaders have absolute dominance in governance. This occurs with the destruction of civilian control over the military, and replacement of civilian political leaders. The military, thus, runs the government and has absolute policy-making powers. Here, the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military is no longer recognized.

Military control can take two forms: military control with or without civilian partners, respectively (Welch, 1976). The former uses of civilians as collaborators or as figurehead to project a semblance of civilian rule; in either case, the military dominates. In the latter, the military rules by itself, usually through a military junta. In whatever form, military control produces the antithesis of civilian rule, namely, the supremacy of military authority.

Obviously, military control considerably differs from military participation. One basic distinction is in governance. With military control, the military simply rules. With military participation, on the other hand, it is still the civilian leaders who govern but in partnership with the military.

Since the granting of independence in 1946, the Philippines has traditionally adhered to the democratic principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, and the only accepted mode of military involvement in politics is through military influence. The country has never experienced military control, but it experienced military participation in politics during the Marcos dictatorship, when the military was elevated as partners in governance. At present, the Arroyo government is faced with the seemingly endless political problems that bring about instability and insecurity, compelling it to consistently rely on the military. The continuing reliance, consequently, has amplified the leverage of the military over the civilian government. This dependence, in turn, has elevated the mode of involvement of the military from normal influence to undue influence. Undue influence, combined with the persistent effort of hostile groups to bring down the government, offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. This creates uncertainty— what keeps the military from entertaining the notion of going beyond the sphere of military influence?

Unwavering Military Support and the Arroyo Government
Since the politicization of the military and the destruction of civilian control during the Martial Law era, the military has always been a force to reckon with in Philippine politics. From the Marcos regime to the Estrada administration, the military and the civilian governments have demonstrated an enduring relationship. The three most palpable instances of military involvements in politics in recent history are the following: (1) During the Marcos government, the military was elevated as an indispensable partner in the dictatorial regime to perpetuate and consolidate Marcos’ hold on power. (2) In the 1986 People Power uprising, which ended the Marcos dictatorship and ushered in the Aquino administration, the military played an instigating role. Its participation, consequently, instilled among military men the popular belief that they gave democracy back to the people. (3) At the height of People Power 2, the chain of command of the military decided to withdraw support from their commander-in-chief. The action paved the way for a swift transition of power from President Estrada to Vice President Arroyo.

The unwavering support of the military to the Arroyo government has been conspicuous throughout her administration. From the beginning to the present, the military has played a central role in the survival of the government. The rest of this section shows the dynamics of that relationship as well as the prominence of the military.

First, President Arroyo, as noted earlier, was elevated to the presidency through the People Power 2 uprising in 2001. The occasion was deemed the culmination of the failure of the impeachment trial against President Estrada. The crisis began when the people started trooping to EDSA after the Senate proceedings abruptly ended. After being persuaded by retired military officers and concluding that the situation was “irreversible,” the military top brass followed suit by declaring their withdrawal of support from the Estrada government (Hernandez, 2001). With ramifications similar to those of People Power 1, the decision made by the military hierarchy in People Power 2 put an indelible military coloration on the eventful occasion. The military believed that, in both occasions, it was the pivotal factor in putting order and in installing civilian government. In assuming office through this circumstance, an occasion marked by military intervention, President Arroyo undoubtedly bears an initial debt of gratitude to the military.

Second, when many hard-core supporters of former President Estrada decided to gather at EDSA, and after some enticement from some of their leaders assaulted Malacañang Palace, the Arroyo government had to rely on its armed component— the police and the military. Although the mob was neutralized primarily through the efforts of anti-riot police, it was believed that the military waited in the wings. The military was ready to obey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to repulse the mob anytime the police failed. Here, just a few months in power, the Arroyo government again felt the value of the military.

Third, in July 2003, 323 junior officers and enlisted men, mostly from the elite services of the military, surreptitiously went to the Makati commercial district and occupied the Oakwood Premier Apartments. Known as the Magdalo group, the mutineers deplored mainly the graft and corruption in the military, demanded the adoption of the vague National Recovery Program of then Senator G. Honasan, and the resignation of President Arroyo. In referring to their actions, the group was adamant in saying that they were unplanned and spontaneous. The findings of the Feliciano Commission (2003), however, point to the conclusion that the Oakwood incident was part of a larger conspiracy to topple the Arroyo government. The standoff was resolved in favor of the government through good intelligence and the timely action taken by the military and the police, primarily by Task Force Libra. The action of the military forced the mutineers to deviate from their original plan and prevented them from linking with their civilian collaborators. The development demonstrated the recurrence of coup threats against the government, as well as the significance of the loyalty of the chain of command in ensuring the survival of the Arroyo government.

Fourth, with the breaking out of the “Hello Garci tapes” scandal, which alleged that in the 2004 presidential election President Arroyo cheated, the government’s legitimacy was put into serious question. The political backlash was immediate— a mass call for the President to resign and an impeachment complaint in the House of Representatives. The situation not only tremendously increased the number of antigovernment forces, but also provided them with an issue behind which to unite. With this backdrop, some anti-government forces, including former allies of President Arroyo (e.g., former President Aquino), took suggestive efforts to generate people power against the government. The concerted effort, however, failed; the anti-government forces were not able to produce a “critical mass.” The people that joined the mass protest were obviously fewer than those that formed People Power 1 and 2. On this volatile occasion, the military stood by the government. The chain of command made persuasive and effective efforts to preclude sympathetic military elements from joining the highly politicized event. The precaution taken by the military is somehow augmented, particularly in the publicity aspect, by the symbolic support expressed at the height of the crisis by ex-President Ramos, a former general. The continued support of the military at the critical moment greatly contributed to the survival of the Arroyo government. The debt of gratitude of the civilian government to the military indubitably became deeper.

Fifth, on the 20th anniversary of People Power, President Arroyo declared a state of emergency through Presidential Proclamation 1017. The declaration was made in response to an attempted coup. According to military intelligence, some officers, particularly Brigadier General D. Lim and Colonel A. Querubin, would launch Oplan Hackle by leading their troops to a mass rally on EDSA on the 24th of February and would announce withdrawal of their support to the government; a feat they had hoped would trigger massive defections from the military. Two days later, another incident linked to the coup attempt created tension— the relief of Major General R. Miranda, commandant of the Marines at Fort Bonifacio. To prevent the implementation of their relief order, Colonel Querubin, with some Marines, barricaded the office of the general, creating a standoff. The standoff was heightened when some prominent antigovernment personalities, including former President Aquino, attempted to go to the military base in an effort suggestive of inciting people power. Both the planned coup and military standoff were thwarted— the former, when the Chief of Staff, General G. Senga, refused the overtures of the plotters (although there were allegations that he initially dilly-dallied); the latter, when the chain of command took swift preemptory action of preventing the civilian and military elements from converging. The Arroyo administration, time and again, had to rely on the military to stabilize the precarious situation. The incident, more importantly, revealed that “during the test of loyalty, when the President crucially needed military support to defend her government, the military… stood by her” (Doronila, 2006, A22).

So far, the military has stood behind the Arroyo government. As an institution, it has kept its commitment to the commander-in-chief and to the Constitution. Because of that support, President Arroyo has been able to fend off all attempts to unseat her. Every effort conducted to undermine the Arroyo government, however, reinforces dependence— as her debt of gratitude has continued to pile up. This constant reliance, unfortunately, has profound repercussions on the civilian government, particularly on civil-military relations.

Military Influence in the Arroyo Government
As mentioned, the balance between the civilian political institution and the military should always be defined by the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, and military influence is the only accepted mode of military involvement in politics. Both the Arroyo administration and the military profess to observe the principle; however, in practice their relationship seems unclear. Although President Arroyo commands the military, circumstances have made her heavily dependent on the latter and have made her government vulnerable and susceptible to making concessions. It is hard to command people who believe that you owe them your life, so to speak.

Dr. Hernandez (2001, 72) observed “that undue influence in politics is encouraged when civilian political leadership and institutions are weak, unstable, and have a low level of popularity and/or legitimacy and/or when the military feels an overwhelming sense of power.” The prevailing unpopularity of President Arroyo, the persisting question of her legitimacy, the lingering coup rumors, and the determined effort of the opposition to remove her from office increase the clout of the military in the civilian government. In addition, the continuing presence of threats to state security brought about by the communist insurgency, Muslim separatists, and terrorist threat, ensures the relevance of the military. No doubt this makes the keen backing of the military to the Arroyo administration imperative. The downside is the amplification of the leverage of the military over the civilian government. This condition, as a consequence, seems to elevate the mode of military involvement in politics from normal influence to undue influence.

The belief in the overwhelming dependence of the civilian government, apparently, has sunk in the mind of some military personnel. The thinking could be inferred from the controversial statement made by a spokesperson of the military, who said that “we hold the nation together.” Whether a statement of fact or just plain brag, that claim seems to insinuate the tremendous dependence of the Arroyo government on the military to remain in power.

Both the Arroyo administration and the military, ironically, benefit from the arrangement— the government is assured of support and the military is guaranteed more elbowroom to operate. For the latter, the setup is ideal, since the military can be seen as operating within the bounds of the democratic framework, while at the same time maintaining a profound influence in government. One gloomy implication of this, however, is that the military top brass might expect the Arroyo administration to be soft on human rights abuses attributed to soldiers— the savior of the state must be protected by the state, so to speak. With a setup seemingly favorable to them, perhaps it is logical to assume that the military, by and large, would continue to support the Arroyo government. This arrangement, possibly, would ensure President Arroyo’s staying in office until 2010.

The easiest way to spot the increase of military influence on any administration is through material benefits. For military personnel, the benefits usually include increase in salaries, perks, allowances, and scholarships; and for the whole military organization, a secured budget and military aid package. Under the Arroyo administration, the military is deemed privileged. For instance, upon assumption to the Presidency, one of the first military reforms instituted by President Arroyo was to substantially increase the basic pay of military personnel (Hernandez, 2006). Military personnel receive a better pay than most public employees. For instance, a new graduate cadet of the Philippine Military Academy is guaranteed a starting basic salary of P17,000.00, which is way above the starting pay of a public school teacher with a master’s degree. The discrepancy is practiced despite the expressed constitutional mandate to prioritize education. Moreover, compared with other government agencies and departments, the Philippine military is usually given preference in financial allocation. For instance, President Arroyo allotted P10 billion in 2007 for the military modernization program, with a promise of more funds to come before her term ends.

Another sign of the significant increase of military influence on President Arroyo is the political appointments. Presidential appointments have strategically been used by the administration as reward for loyalty, as reward for debts of gratitude, as an instrument of appeasement, or as insurance for future support. Hence, there is the frequent appointment of retired military and police officers, mostly Philippine Military Academy graduates to either high-paying or influential government positions. On President Arroyo’s first term alone, she made the biggest number of military appointees to the civilian bureaucracy after President Ramos (Gloria, 2003). The deluge of military appointments, ironically, happened despite having a woman and nonmilitary person as President. The number of military appointments is expected to significantly increase before her term ends in 2010. If the trend continues, the increase might even exceed the appointments made by President Ramos, an ex-general. Among the military appointees in her Cabinet are General E. Ermita (Executive Secretary), General A. Ebdane (Secretary of National Defense), General A. Reyes (Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources), and General L. Mendoza (Secretary of Transportation and Communications). With the generals in the Cabinet, the influence of the military on the President is, no doubt, formidable.

Some appointments are also marred with controversy. For instance, the late General R. Wycoco, although not a lawyer or certified public accountant, was appointed head of the National Bureau of Investigation. Another instance is the seeming “militarization” of the Department of Transportation and Communications. Here, the top positions of the agency are filled by former police generals; who are also Philippine Military Academy graduates. Secretary Leandro Mendoza, a former chief of the Philippine National Police, is joined by retired Navy Officer Abraham Abesamis (commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission), former police Director Reynaldo Berroya (head of the Land Transportation Office), and former police General Thompson Lantion (head of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board) (Fernandez, 2006). The practice of appointing retired military and police officers all over the government, although perfectly legal, appears to devalue civilian authority. Despite this seemingly unpleasant prospect, President Arroyo appears resolute to sustain the military appointment policy in exchange for military support.

Moreover, she not only appointed but also allowed the expansion of the activity of the military. Early in her term, President Arroyo called for the military “to be at the forefront in her campaign to weed out poverty and take a more active role in governance” (Gloria, 2003, 15). The declaration is tantamount to allowing the military to enlarge the scope of its operations, thus, permitting it to directly encroach on traditionally civilian areas of responsibility. An example consistent with the mandate is “the Mamamayang Kawal program” of General B. Dolorfino, Commanding General of the National Capital Region. In the program, 5,000 soldiers would be embedded in the metropolis, particularly in urban slum areas, to do community services. Under the program, the military will help in disaster preparedness and prevention programs, provide free legal assistance and medical examinations, conduct education campaigns, and promote the military’s Community Development program (Alave, 2007). The work that the military will do, obviously, is beyond the traditional scope of its activity.

Pro-military policies are another area where the extraordinary influence of the military can be seen. Probably the best example here is Executive Order 464. The directive prohibits government and military officials from attending a congressional inquiry without the expressed approval of the President. As the government alleged, the directive was designed to eliminate the opportunity for antigovernment legislators to grandstand at the expense of government officials, particularly the generals. Accordingly, the directive not only protects civilian officials from interrogation in Congress; more importantly, it insulates the generals from unwarranted persecution. Clearly, this is an order that the military appreciates, considering its well-known deep-seated hatred for grandstanding politicians. The directive, however, is a provocative action by the executive branch against the legislative branch of government. It disregards the Constitution by preventing Congress, a co-equal branch, from doing one of its fundamental functions. Despite the apparent infringement on the legislative prerogative to conduct investigations, President Arroyo seemed determined to risk constitutional violation to shield her loyal defender.

In the case of Proclamation 1017, on the premise that there was a conspiracy from the left, the right, and the center to bring down the government, President Arroyo proclaimed a state of emergency. Since it is common knowledge that the declaration is a Presidential prerogative, the benefit of the doubt as to its validity thus lies in favor of the President. In implementing the proclamations, the military, however, created a predicament. In applying General Order No. 5 in particular, excessive force and some abuses are believed to have been committed— for instance, the raid and prompt closure of the office of the newspaper Daily Tribune. Here, the Arroyo administration, instead of proceeding to look into the matter, defended outright the actions of the soldiers. Such adamant support seems to indicate that the government is tolerating the abuses committed. How can you prosecute the people that neutralized the forces out to topple you?
A law that will have a profound impact in consolidating the power of the military is the Human Security Act of 2007 (Republic Act No.9372; a.k.a. the Anti-Terrorism Law). The law was passed primarily due to pressure from the United States (vis-à-vis the global war against terrorism), and the strong lobbying of the police and the military. The latter signified all-out support for the law; since they will be its main beneficiary. In theory, the law is expected to significantly improve the capacity of the armed sector to enforce security measures. By defining terrorism as the act of “sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand,” the law will make it easier for the military to tag antigovernment groups, including its main nemesis— the New People’s Army— as a terrorist group. Although a watered-down version of the law was passed by Congress, still, the enactment reflects the continuing support of the Arroyo government and her allies in Congress to the military— by leaning toward their hard-line approach to security problems.
At the moment, perhaps, the most blatant manifestation of the undue influence of the military is the apparent apathy of the Arroyo government in addressing extrajudicial killings. Nationwide killings have claimed the lives of more than 800 civilians, mostly activists, since 2001. Although not all, most of the killings are attributed to some groupings in the military. The allegation has been supported by the findings of the Melo Commission— “there is some circumstantial evidence to support the proposition that some elements within or with connection to the military are responsible to [sic] the killings.” The assumption is bolstered by the common thinking that only an extensive and armed institution like the military can perpetuate such systematic countrywide killings for so long. The factions from the left of the political spectrum, moreover, are insinuating that there could be a grand underground scheme by some groups in the military to deliberately eliminate them. On several occasions, the Arroyo administration has officially denied any involvement or toleration. It also has publicly condemned the killings; nonetheless, the public and the international community are not convinced that the government has exerted serious efforts to solve and end the killings. For instance, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights, P. Alston, has concluded that the government failed to “respond effectively and authentically to the significant number of killings” (Doronila, 2007a, 11); and a US Senate inquiry, chaired by Senator B. Boxer, concluded that President Arroyo “was not doing enough to hold military authorities responsible for the killings” (Doronila, 2007b, 1).

The continuation of the wave of killings, despite public outcry and media attention, presupposes a climate of impunity. The situation is exacerbated by President Arroyo’s open praises for General J. Palparan, who is blamed for some of the killings. It is widely believed that the only way for the government to stop extrajudicial killings is to have the political will. However, the military, intently protective of its personnel, seems to hold President Arroyo hostage. As Doronila (2007a, 11) aptly puts it: “The president faces risks if she presses the military to prosecute its own personnel for human rights atrocities and not condone these abuses. Such crackdown could erode her support… She cannot push the military too hard without provoking a mutiny. The military is the main pillar of support of her weak government.”

Despite the enormous influence of the military, it is also important to note that such influence has not reached the same level it enjoyed during Martial Law, when as partner of the dictator the military legitimately participated in governance. During the government of President Aquino, the influence of the military significantly increased due to the perennial coup attempts; nevertheless, such influence did not translate into full-fledged participation in politics.

Obviously, the military has greatly benefited from the instability and insecurity of the Arroyo administration. The weakened state of government as a consequence, has provided the military the opportunity to increase its clout in the government, with its influence rising from normal to high-level political influence. That undue influence, along with the persistent effort of hostile groups to bring down the Arroyo government, offers the military an ideal situation to further elevate its involvement in politics. However, the military has refrained from entertaining such a notion; it has confined itself and has not moved beyond the sphere of influence. This raises the question— what prevents the military from aspiring to further increase its involvement in politics from a high level influence to outright political participation, or even control?

Factors Sustaining Civilian Political Authority
Despite the dependence of the Arroyo government on the military, several neutralizing factors operate to reinforce civilian political authority and encourage adherence to democratic principles. These factors appear to dilute the military’s involvement in politics and its clout in the civilian government:

First, the consistent lack of public support for a military coup. As shown consistently by various surveys (primarily SWS and Pulse Asia), public opinion is overwhelmingly against military adventurism in whatever form against the civilian government. The results of surveys have been substantiated by the lack of popular support for military actions, from the coups in the 1980s to Oplan Hackle.

For instance, whenever Oakwood mutineer Lt. Senior Grade A. Trillanes has an opportunity to talk to the media, he always urges the Filipino people to make a decision— the public will have to make a stand either for or against the government. The young officer, unfortunately, does not realize that public apathy is already a decision— it means the public does not support or agree with the actions and methods of these young “idealistic” soldiers. This attitude has broad unanimity even among the middle class, which is deemed to be the critical segment of Philippine society.

As aptly expressed by Austero (2006) in a well-circulated open letter in the internet, “we already responded to your calls, and our response has been very clear— we chose not to heed your calls.” It is clear that the unpopularity of President Arroyo does not translate into public support for military action outside of the democratic framework. Even with a weak and dependent government, the lack of public support puts a potent restraint on future military involvement in politics. Thus, the military cannot overstep its bounds— as a warning, the Filipino public will not tolerate such act.

Second, the unwavering loyalty of the majority of local officials. Local officials, from mayors, governors, and representatives are dependable allies of the administration. The support is evident in the actions taken by local officials in defense of the Arroyo government. For instance, Mayor R. Duterte of Davao rhetorically made seditious remarks in the media annoucing his intention to declare the independence of Mindanao if President Arroyo would be ousted extra-constitutionally.

Another, at the height of the concerted call for the President to resign, wherein the call seems to be producing a domino effect, at the critical point, the majority of the local officials responded by expressing their overwhelming support to the President, either by physically trooping to Malacañang or announcing their support in the media. In the Liberal Party, Manila Mayor J. Atienza took a drastic and divisive action to wrestle the party leadership from Senate President Drilon, since the latter decided to severe ties with President Arroyo. Apparently, the move was in pursuance of the desire of some members of the Liberal Party who want to maintain their coalition with the Arroyo government.

In the House of Representatives, the overwhelming trashing of two impeachment cases against the President is probably the strongest statement of support of the allies of the Arroyo administration. Their actions flash a caveat to all antigovernment forces, including the military— despite the unpopularity of President Arroyo, her government still enjoys the unwavering support of the majority of locally elected officials. In other words, the government might be short in popularity, which is something not permanent, but long on the support of powerful and influential local politicians. Thus, equilibrium is generated: dependence on military support is balanced by the strong backing of local officials.

Third, the improvement in economic performance. Even after a military mutiny, an attempted coup plot, several bids to ignite people power, defections of many political allies and so forth, it is perplexing to see the Arroyo administration demonstrating a positive economic achievement. The economic upturn seems to sharply boost the level of confidence of the government and the business sector. Considering the improvement in economic performance from the last quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2007: stock prices surged to the highest level in nearly 10 years, the peso breached the P50.00 to a U.S. dollar barrier and continues to gain strength, the foreign exchange reserve has hit an all-time high of $23 billion, inflation is lowest in 3 years, the government budgetary deficit of P62 billion has declined for the fourth straight year, and, lastly, the government posted in 2006 satisfactory economic growth of 5.5 percent.

Despite the standard opposition reply that the growth still needs to be felt by the ordinary Filipino, undeniably, the figures strongly point to a sensible economic direction. Following the aphorism that “whoever sits does not matter as long as it could the deliver goods,” the upward economic trend will gradually generate a good public perception of the government and the military. If the government is perceived as capable of delivering the goods, then, that perception could be a persuasive factor in neutralizing the undue influence of the military. Despite the political instability, President Arroyo can say that under her administration the country has a clear economic agenda. The positive trend, hence, offers a sound rationale for the military to maintain its support to the government.

Fourth, the instituted reforms to buttress civilian control. Instituted reforms, particularly policies that promote professionalism and constitutionalism, have enhanced civilian control over the military. The reforms are grounded on the belief that military professionalism and firm acceptance of the supremacy of civilian authority are truly effective checks vis-à-vis the military (Finer, 1976). The most visible reforms are those introduced in the 1987 Constitution to reestablish civilian democratic control. Among there is the creation of oversight bodies, wherein power over appointments and promotion, power over the budget, and power of investigation were assumed by Congress (Hernandez, 2002). Another is reforms instituted under rubric of the Security Sector Reform (SSR). An important part of SSR consists of policies and programs that seek to promote democratic governance over the security sector; for instance, the creation of the Military Grievance Board, establishment of the office of internal auditor within the military organizations, and the appointment a civilian Secretary of National Defense. Moreover, these reforms call not only for upholding the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, but also for the effective functioning of institutions like the Supreme Court, media, and civil society.

As to promoting professionalism, there is a need for reorientation and value-formation programs to “reeducate” the military on democratic civilian control and military professionalism (Hernandez and Ubarra, 1999). Basic democratic tenets must be inculcated in the minds of military personnel. For instance, (1) the military must always follow the Commander-in-Chief and uphold the Constitution, regardless of who is sitting as President, and (2) the military must recognize that determining the legitimacy of a government is not its duty since, under the democratic setup, the Supreme Court is the body with the power to ultimately decide on that question. President Arroyo, undoubtedly, has benefited from past reforms. On one hand, her political weakness is compensated by other institutions that reinforce civilian control. On the other, the “reeducation” of the military, to a certain extent, has preempted any action to venture outside the sphere of political influence.

Fifth, the wisdom acquired from past dealings with the military. The wisdom acquired by the Arroyo administration from its own and past governments’ dealing with the military has provided a crucial guide for the government. In particular, the experiences have made President Arroyo astute in handling the military. Referring to the President’s survivability, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2006, A10) has described her as “one smart political tactician who has outmaneuvered her opponents at every turn.”

Not only is her government surviving, she seems to be getting smarter and stronger as time passesby. For instance, heeding the recommendation of the Feliciano Commission, the government realized that the appeasement strategy of the past, as adopted by President Ramos, is good only in the short term. To ensure a long-term solution to military adventurism, the government must resolutely move against rebellious factions in the military. This means apprehension, trial, and incarceration of subversive military personnel and officers. Armed with this knowledge, the Arroyo government seems to be determined in prosecuting suspected mutineers and coup plotters. The action enhances civilian political authority because it delivers the message that, in her administration, military adventurism will be dealt with severely.

Sixth, the historical subordination of the military. Since the birth of the Philippine Republic in 1946, the military has always been subordinated to civilian authority. Throughout the history of the country, there is no precedence of total military dominance. Even during the two most dynamic years of the military— the coup years of the Aquino administration and the Martial Law years— the military remained subordinated to civilian authority.

In the former, despite enormous dependence on military support (to survive against the series of coups) that led to increase in influence, the chain of command maintained allegiance to President Aquino.

In the latter, despite having been made a partner in the dictatorial regime, the military, during the Martial Law era was still subordinated although not to the civilian political institutions but to a civilian dictator (Hernandez, 1984). The weight of history, thus, is squarely behind the Arroyo government and against military adventurism. The fact is further reinforced in that, strictly speaking, no coup has ever succeeded in the Philippines. The dismal success rate of coups is a warning to the military not to exceed its bound, as history is not on its side.

Seventh, the anti-military regime norm. In the contemporary era, dominated by liberal democracies, the global norm is against military rule and in favor of civilian authority. Civilian, not military, government is the accepted standard of political system. As Alagappa (2001) explains: “The legitimacy problem of the military is compounded by the fact that military rule is no longer an acceptable form of government in the contemporary era.” Military rule, hence, lacks the moral right to govern and can never be legitimized. The norm ultimately sets the trend— the global decline of extensive military involvement in politics— and makes civilian control fashionable. For instance, advanced democratic countries and multilateral financial institutions, whose external support and monetary aid are essential for economic development, will be wary of helping a military state (Hernandez, 2002). Despite the dependence of the Arroyo government on military support, the external environment makes it unfavorable and unsustainable for the military to go beyond its traditional bounds. By today’s standards, to do so is repulsive to society and, in the long term, detrimental to the country as well as to the military institution.

Eighth, the development of a symbiotic relationship. The dependence of the Arroyo government on the military has developed a symbiotic relationship between the two. Ordinarily, a civilian government dependent on the military is not an ideal setup; however, the reliability of military support, when the survival of the civilian government is threatened, is always a positive note. The arrangement affords the military the opportunity to have the “best of both worlds;” it is presented the opportunity to exercise a profound political influence on the Arroyo government, while maintaining a democratic posture acceptable to modern civilian society. Although the military exerts enormous clout, it cannot be held responsible; in case of government failure, the civilian government will take the brunt of the blame. In the Philippine case, the public will always see government failure as the responsibility of the Arroyo government, not of the military. Thus, there is a premium to maintaining the relationship— on one hand, the Arroyo government has a dependable military, and on the other, the military enjoys enormous political influence behind a democratic façade, but with less or little accountability.

Lastly, the fear of dividing the military. Any action by the military to undermine civilian authority in a society that embraces democracy would be very risky. Considering the dedication and multitude of pro-democracy forces, challenging the norm can be disruptive to society and detrimental to the military as an institution. To attempt to go beyond their traditional scope of political involvement, the military faces the danger of dividing the military organization itself, since the possibility is strong that the action would generate factionalism, particularly if the pro-democratic forces within the military would counteract any move against the civilian authority.

Moreover, the worst probability for the military, in case it fails in its bid to expand power, is the total abolition of the organization, similar to what happened in Costa Rica in 1948. Thus, the price for undermining civilian authority, undoubtedly, is too high even for a highly organized institution like the military. As both a rational and conservative institution, the military is always expected to enhance its interest and preserve its unity. Following this logic, the military vis-à-vis the Arroyo government is expected to continue striving for more influence in politics without, however, compromising its unity. Perhaps, the fear of dividing the military creates an inherent mechanism of internal check, producing natural self-inhibition among the military.

Notwithstanding the political weakness of the Arroyo government and its dependence on the military— in the past and in the foreseeable future— these neutralizing factors appear to bind the military to remain within the realm of political influence. Despite the opportunity presented by circumstances to exercise more than undue influence, this level of political involvement would likely be the limit. It is improbable that the military would extend its domain to military participation or military control, as any such move would be counteracted and tamed by the factors mentioned above.

The undue influence of the military, moreover, is not irreversible. Increased influence is a consequence of the need of the times— ensuring the survival and security of the government. With the seemingly endless crises hounding the Arroyo administration, the reliance might last for some time. However, the moment the situation improves and the motivation for dependence diminishes, the military influence would revert to the normal level.

Conclusion
The persistent dependence of the Arroyo government on the military has grave implications on the relationship between the civilian government and the military institution. The circumstance, understandably, has profoundly enhanced the influence of the military, allowing its undue influence in the government. Among the manifestations of the strengthened influence of the military are material benefits, political appointments, expansion of activity, pro-military policies, and apparent apathy of the government toward human rights abuses attributed to the military.

Several factors, however, have worked for the civilian government to dilute the effects of dependence and ensure the preeminence of civilian authority. The Arroyo government has benefited from these neutralizing factors: first, the consistent lack of public support for a military coup; second, the unwavering loyalty of the majority of local officials; third, the improvement in economic performance; fourth, the reforms instituted to buttress civilian control; fifth, the wisdom acquired from past dealings with the military; sixth, the historical subordination of the military to civilian authority; seventh, the anti-military regime norm; eighth, the development of a symbiotic relationship; and lastly, the fear of dividing the military. These factors provide enough reasons for the military not to seek the level of military participation or military control, but to simply confine itself to political exercise permitted by the democratic framework. These counteracting factors reinforce the politically weak Arroyo government, ensuring the continuity of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military.


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